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CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY-INSTITUTIONS
OF AMELIORATION*
Kent Greenawalt**
I. INTRODUCTION

TN his rich, intricate, and wise examination of themes from the
.Crito,1 A. D. Woozley explores Socrates' proposal, put in the
mouth of the personified laws of Athens, that the duty of a citizen
2
is to obey a law or to persuade society that the law is wrong. If
this position is understood to permit disobedience and attempted
persuasion after a law is adopted, one of its implications 4 is that
on some occasions when people intentionally break the law, those
who administer the law may properly decline to impose the stipulated punishment, because they believe that disobedience was justified. Suggesting that the problem of disobedience raised by Socrates' "persuade-or-obey doctrine" concerns the individual's choice
of action less than the system's response, Professor Woozley analyzes some of the delicate questions about criteria that officials
might use to decide which lawbreakers should be excused from
punishment. 5 These questions were left undiscussed by Socrates
and have received much less attention in the past two decades
than has the moral justifiability of individual acts of lawbreaking.
This article attempts to carry forward that effort.
The subject of this article is somewhat broader in conception
* Copyright © 1981 by Kent Greenawalt.

* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University. The author hopes to expand the analysis in this essay as part of a book-length treatment of moral claims to disobey
the law. He is grateful for a summer grant from the Kayden Research Fund, which has
made this work possible.
A. WOOZLEY, LAW AND OBEDIENCE 29-38 (1979).
2 Id.
3 A possible "weaker" meaning is that the citizen has an opportunity to persuade that a

law is bad before it is passed and therefore is obligated to obey it after it is passed. See id.
at 30.
4 I mean "implication" only in a loose sense. One could without logical inconsistency assert both that citizens are sometimes justified in disobeying laws as part of an effort to

persuade others of their wrongness and that they should nevertheless, without exception, be
punished. This is, however, neither the apparent import of the relevant passages nor a very
appealing position.
I A. WOOZLEY, supra note 1, at 31-37.
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than Professor Woozley's problem, because I wish to include instances in which the lawbreaker's claim that he acted justifiably
does not fit the persuade-or-obey model: instances in which the
actor asserts, for example, that the values of the law were simply
outweighed in his situation by more compelling considerations or
that he acted upon strong moral conviction without hope or expectation of persuading others to that conviction. My topic embraces
all those situations in which an actor might honestly say, "I intentionally committed an act that is ordinarily a violation of law and
knew that I was doing so at the time, but nonetheless what I did
was morally justified or within my moral rights." I inquire how officials involved in the system of legal punishment in the United
States should respond to such claims. Much of the analysis takes
as given existing laws, institutional structures, and present assumptions about the scope of particular roles, 6 but I also ask what
kinds of basic changes might lead to more appropriate responses to
moral claims to disobey.
A.

Agencies of Amelioration

Moral claims by actors who have committed what would usually
be violations of mandatory legal obligations can be "taken into
account" at various stages of the legal process. Those who are responsible for proceeding against violators-the police and prosecutors-may act more leniently by declining to proceed at all, by offering a reduced charge, or by recommending a light sentence.
When pardons and amnesties apply to offenders who have not yet
been prosecuted, they foreclose further police or prosecutorial action. How moral claims may bear on the exercise of responsibilities
of those who apply the substantive law-judges and jurors-is
more complicated. The law as a whole may be written to make an
apparent violation of law (or what would be a violation if engaged
in by someone else) legally permissible if the argument presented
by the actor is convincing (or if he demonstrates the sincerity of
his moral convictions). In somewhat different ways constitutional
safeguards, the open-ended necessity justification, and conscientious objector statutes operate in this fashion. When these are cor6 More precisely, I rely on my understanding of present assumptions, making no systematic attempt to demonstrate the correctness of that understanding.
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rectly applied, officials make a determination that, all things considered, the actor has not disobeyed a valid legal norm. If no such
provision can properly be construed to excuse the actor, judges or
jurors may still have the power to refuse to hold the law applicable
to his behavior. Such action in some sense "nullifies" the law,
whether the decision is unexplained, defended as an open repudiation of the law, or concealed under the guise of ordinary interpretation. Officials who determine the nature and severity of punishment may also be influenced by asserted moral justifications.
These officials include judges who impose initial sentences, parole
boards that determine dates of release from prison and related
matters, and the executive and legislative agencies with authority
to pardon individuals or classes of offenders. Until recently, the
modern practice has been to give judges and parole boards wide
discretion concerning decisions about sentencing, and their decisions to be harsh or lenient have typically not involved disregard of
relevant norms. When judges are faced with substantial mandatory
minimum sentences, however, they may be able to impose a lenient
sentence only by nullifying the law. Finally, officials who actually
administer punishment (as well as pretrial restrictions on liberty)
may possibly respond to moral claims in favor of disobedience either by permitting escape or by making accommodations regarding
the conditions of restraint.
B. Moral Claims to Commit Otherwise Illegal Acts and the
Purposes of Punishment
Why should moral claims to do what is otherwise illegal matter
at all for criminal punishment? Or, to turn the question around, if
society has judged behavior to be wrongful and the actor has engaged in that behavior, why should he not receive the same punishment as others who engage in the behavior? The brief answer to
this query is that in respect to important purposes of punishment,
the actor who sincerely asserts a moral claim is not like other
violators.
The difference is clearest when officials can rightly say that the
actor is correct in his moral claim. Whatever may be the case when
social standards diverge from any "higher" standards of morality
that may exist, an actor's claim will certainly be "correct" if it follows both the moral evaluations of a majority of the community
and any higher standards that may be applicable. The actor's
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moral claim may be either that he was morally justified in acting
as he did or that he had a moral right to do so. In the sense that I
am using the terms, an act is morally justified if it is morally preferable to, or at least not morally worse than, the relevant alternative; an actor has a moral right (against society) to perform an act
if society's interference with the act would be morally wrong.7
Given these senses, individuals may have moral rights to perform
acts (e.g., criticize their spouses harshly) that are not themselves
morally justified; and they may be justified in breaking the law on
occasions when society would not violate any moral right by trying
to stop them.
We need first to establish the possibility that society can agree
with an actor's moral claim to violate a law,8 confronting the possible objection that "the law. . . represents the moral judgment of
the majority, and its sense of justice."" Of course, many laws are
highly technical and themselves reflect no obvious moral judgment,
but these laws might be said to implement fundamental moral
judgments of the community. A more critical objection to the view
that the law represents society's moral judgment is that legislatures sometimes pass laws that represent the moral judgments of a
minority and are at odds with the moral judgments of the majority;
this happens because the minority's sentiments are more intense or
because members of the minority have greater influence in the political process. Moreover, legislators are slow to repeal laws that
embody entrenched moral views (e.g., against homosexual acts)
even when those views cease to be embraced by most citizens.
Most important, when a law does reflect the moral sentiment of
the community, that moral sentiment need not support every potential application of the law. Even if the majority thinks the acts
required by the law to be generally desirable and even if it believes
that the existence of the law provides further strong reasons- relating to implied consent, desirable consequences, or fairness- for
performing the required acts, it may nevertheless agree with the
actor that pressing considerations to the contrary can justify diso7 See J. RAz, TIE AUTHORITY OF LAW 266-67 (1979); A. WOOZLEY, supra note 1, at 37.
" Of course, if the larger law actually recognizes a justification for the actor's behavior, no
problem arises over whether society may agree with the moral claim.
9 Rostow, The Rightful Limits of Freedom in a Liberal Democratic State: Of Civil Disobedience, in Is LAw D.A&)46 (E.Rostow ed. 1971).
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bedience. Few citizens, indeed, would say that a speed limit should
not be broken if that is necessary to save the life of a critically
injured person. A majority may even think that disobedience of a
law that conforms to its moral judgment is justified as a protest
against a different law or policy. The majority's view that intentional interference with traffic is generally unacceptable does not,
for example, compel the conclusion that actors will always be morally unjustified if they block traffic to protest a locality's dangerous failure to install a traffic light or the decision of a president to
use tactical nuclear weapons in a limited war. Thus, even if most of
a society's laws reflect the moral judgments of the majority, and
the actor and the majority both take rather stringent views about a
citizen's obligation to obey the law,10 some occasions, including occasions for protest, may arise when actors regard disobedience as
1 In an essay written a decade ago, I took a heavily consequentialist approach to disobedience to law, declining to adopt a distinction between civil disobedience and other disobedience and arguing that individuals contemplating whether to disobey the law should be
guided by whether that disobedience would probably contribute to the social good. See
Greenawalt, A Contextual Approach to Disobedience, in POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION
332 (1970), reprinted in 70 COLUM. L. REv. 48 (1970). I still subscribe to many of the positions I took there: namely, that disobedience not easily classifiable as civil disobedience can
often be justified on consequentialist grounds; that ordinary citizens do not "consent" (explicitly or implicitly) to obey the law in any manner that creates the strong source of political obligation assumed by traditional social contract theory; and that consequentialist reasons powerfully support obedience to law, peaceful disobedience on most occasions when
any disobedience is called for, and submission to punishment when the law has been broken.
For a much more skeptical position about the power of consequentialist argument, see A.
WoozLEY, supra note 1, at 111-21. I also have not given up the belief that an ideal moral
agent might be guided by something like my consequentialist calculus in his determinations
about disobedience. That said, there are some qualifications and reservations I would now
add to my earlier treatment, as well as exploration of some points I barely touched. I am
persuaded that an open-ended consequentialist calculus is not well fitted as an exclusive or
primary instrument for individual decisions with social consequences. Consequences are
often so incalculable, and individuals are so disposed to find that the general welfare coincides with their own interests or passions, that asking individuals to refer to the overall
social good almost invites them to follow whatever inclinations they presently have. More
discrete principles are needed to help guide individuals in these difficult decisions. For this
purpose, distinctions between civil disobedience and other disobedience, emphasis on considerations of fairness, and general presuppositions about peaceful behavior and submission
to punishment are warranted. These principles can be viewed as ones that rational but imperfect moral agents could accept as practically workable standards for action in a real society. One would no doubt need to go further to talk about exceptions and the possibility that
the generally applicable principles and limits for disobedience could be overridden in specific instances by extraordinarily powerful consequentialist reasons, but the effort would, in
any event, not rest with an open-ended consequentialist standard.
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morally justified and the majority agrees.
Many of the ordinary reasons for punishment simply do not apply when actors are morally justified in engaging in behavior that
ordinarily is illegal. Subject to a possible exception noted below,
morally justified acts are not, on balance, harmful to the legitimate
interests of the members of society, and society would not want to
discourage those acts. Society has no reason to prevent such acts
by means of incapacitation, general and individual deterrence, and
norm reinforcement. If the act has been performed for morally justifiable reasons, moral delinquency could not be a basis for punishment, and commission of the act would not provide a ground for
reform of character. Nor could the majority of society desire vengeance if it recognizes the appropriateness of the act. An actor who
has benefited from his justified act may have gained a position of
advantage vis-A-vis his counterpart who has obeyed the law,1 but
if the act was actually justified, it is doubtful that the advantage
can properly be characterized as unfair or will be so perceived by
the majority. A minority, particularly those who have obeyed and
not obtained the advantage, may harbor resentment over perceived
unfairness, and punishment might be conceived as a way of reassuring its members. Beyond this, arguments for punishment may
rest on the inability of citizens and officials to identify accurately
the acts of disobedience that are morally justified and on the inappropriateness of officials attempting to do so. Excusing justified
illegal acts may weaken the restraints of deterrence and norm acceptance with respect to unjustified illegal acts that bear resemblance to the justified ones, and when officials are not able to dis-

1 Complying counterparts will not be worse off in every situation in which actors stand
to gain. Often disobedient acts will not themselves involve any particular benefit, and the
gains won by the acts may reach nonparticipants. Illegal acts of protest during the civil
rights movement are illustrative here. Professor Woozley draws a distinction between pure
and impure lawbreakers, classifying as impure all those who have something to gain by
breaking the law. See A. WoozLzY, supra note 1, at 35-36. He has in mind mainly those who

will derive immediate material profit from disobedience, but blacks certainly stood to gain
in the long run from civil rights protests, as did whites who believed that integration would
produce relations between whites and blacks that were better for whites as well as for
blacks. It seems odd to say that the only "pure" protesters were those whites and blacks
who did not expect (or hope) that the consequence of protest would be to make their lives
better; certainly it would be mistaken to put much weight on a distinction thus drawn.
For an account of a retributive theory of punishment that makes injustice toward those
who have complied with the law central, see J. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE AND THRPY
77-115 (1979).
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tinguish unjustified illegal acts, any principle that they may excuse
justified illegal acts may result in some refusals to punish when the
purposes of punishment would be more fully served. Finally, the
appropriateness of some government officials setting themselves
up to determine when illegal acts are morally justified may be
doubted. This problem is explored below. Once we see, however,
that the more straightforward bases for punishment do not apply
to morally justified illegal acts, we are ready to reflect with sensitivity on the possible desirability of various agencies of
amelioration.
The analysis of responses to correct claims of moral right is
somewhat different. If the actor's behavior is itself morally justified, the law's violation of a moral right against the intervention of
society 2 is simply an additional reason why punishment may not
be appropriate. The interesting problem concerns the situation in
which a law violates a moral right (e.g., by interfering with
nondeviant sexual relations between adult single members of opposite genders),1 3 but the actor has exercised his moral right in a
morally unjustified way (e.g., by deceitfully professing affection, he
engages in sexual relations with his superior solely to improve his
position in the firm). Though some purposes may be served by
punishing this unjustified behavior, the premise that the actor has
a moral right against society to engage in the behavior carries with
it the conclusion that society has been wrong in deciding to punish
the behavior. This conclusion, however, need not necessarily conclude the issue about punishment. One possibility is the introduction of a distinction between the actor's original moral right and
his moral rights, all things considered, after the law is adopted.
Perhaps the presence of the law places upon him an obligation to
obey the law that in some sense outweighs his original right to engage in the behavior in question. If so, the concession that the law
violates his moral rights may not decide the question whether he

12 I talk about a moral right "against society" because it may be that interested private
parties will not have a moral duty to refrain from interference even if organized society does
have such a duty. We should not blithely assume that in respect to action designed to influence behavior the appropriate restraints on private actors and organized society will necessarily be coextensive. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Some Related Limits of Law, in THE LIMITS OF
LAW 76, 85 (1974).
iS 1 put the right this narrowly in order to be confident that it is now supported by majority community sentiment.
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had a moral right to disobey the law, and punishment might be
grounded on the belief that he did not have that right. This position will be discussed below. Other arguments in favor of punishment are based on the difficulties of identification and constraints
on official roles that have already been mentioned.
When the actor believes that his act is morally justified or within
his moral rights and society disagrees, the arguments for punishment are stronger. In society's view, the actor has engaged in
harmful, unjustified behavior, and it may wish to prevent him and
others from committing similar acts. Still, there are reasons against
punishment that do not apply to ordinary violations of the criminal law. Unless his moral sentiments are themselves abhorrent, the
actor who behaves out of conviction deserves condemnation less
than the criminal who acts in the pursuit of private gain or from
undisciplined passion. Moreover, he typically will not be an apt
candidate for reform. The strength of conviction and willingness to
sacrifice that are required to act against self-interest in doing what
one believes to be morally right are rightly considered admirable
traits, not usually to be visited with harsh penalties. When such
penalties are inflicted, they are likely to produce alienation and
bitterness in the conscientious actors who bear them. Thus, even
when the majority of society is firmly convinced that the actor's
assessment of relevant moral claims is mistaken, it may have substantial reasons to avoid punishment.
The body of this essay addresses the following questions about
the agencies of possible amelioration: Does the law authorize officials to excuse or treat more leniently those whose commission of
otherwise illegal acts is based on some moral claim, or are such
decisions outside the law? How far does the law supply criteria by
which such decisions can be made? What position about possible
leniency and what criteria of decision should be accepted by officials working within the United States? What alterations in existing law or institutional understandings could help achieve more
appropriate responses to conflicts between mandatory laws and the
perceived claims of morality? The importance and difficulty of
each of these inquiries varies greatly among the different agencies
of amelioration, and so the space allotted to their discussion is uneven. As we shall see, many of the basic questions hardly yield simple "yes" or "no" answers, but facing these questions helps us to
develop considered opinions about the crucial issues. By concen-
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trating on each possibility of amelioration in turn, the discussion
may underemphasize the extent to which each is related to the
others in a whole system; obviously, intelligent reflection about the
present scope of one kind of official responsibility and about directions of desirable change must rest on an appreciation of how one
role meshes with other roles in enforcement of the criminal law.

II. EXEMPTIONS WITHIN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW FOR BEHAVIOR
THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE ILLEGAL
Some rules of substantive law, in effect, respond to particular
kinds of moral claims by making permissible behavior that would
otherwise be illegal. I shall discuss two of these in some depth, the
general justification of "necessity" and conscientious objector provisions, and briefly mention a third, defenses of unconstitutionality
that track claims of moral right.
Initially, some explanation is needed as to why these legal standards, which accommodate moral claims within the law, belong in
an essay devoted to conflicts between law and morality. Statutory
conscientious objector provisions are easiest to explain, because
they vary markedly from most legal standards. These provisions,
which explicitly exempt defined classes of individuals from otherwise applicable obligations, constitute one legislative response to
clear conflicts between general legal requirements and the moral
convictions of an identifiable minority.
The so-called necessity defense states a general principle that
justifies otherwise criminal action when the values served by the
action outweigh in that context the values protected by the relevant criminal provision. Whether adopted by courts as an aspect of
the common law or embodied in a statutory code, it reflects a determination of the desirability of some broad standard of evaluation against which the application of criminal penalties can be
measured. Other justification defenses, such as self-defense, also
represent judgments about morally appropriate action and exempt
behavior that would otherwise be criminal. They, too, may involve
some moral evaluation at the point of application, as those deciding upon guilt determine whether the action was "reasonable" or
try to define the proper scope of official authority. Yet we think of
these defenses as defming the limits of the criminal sanction in
terms of moral values, not as resolving some hypothetical conflict
between the law as it would otherwise apply and morality. The
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special feature of the necessity defense is the generality of its standard, making its application much closer to an overall moral evaluation of behavior, the sort of assessment that might lead to jury
nullification or a decision not to prosecute. This special feature
warrants inclusion of the defense here, but we should be mistaken
to overlook important similarities between it and other justification defenses; 14 and our analysis of this broad defense may have
relevance for the operation of more specific justifications.
Only some invocations of constitutional right are relevant for my
purposes-those in which the actor asserts that behavior in conflict with a mandatory obligation is supported by some open-ended
constitutional standard that protects moral rights, such as the free
speech and free exercise clauses. 15 Even with such clauses, the language, historical intent, and patterns of interpretation clearly settle many cases, but in other instances, judges must engage in broad
evaluation that resembles what is required by the necessity defense, with the important differences being that the standards of
decision are more focused and concentrate on rights against the
government rather than on moral justifications for behavior.
Obviously, if the law itself contains an exemption for behavior
that would otherwise be criminal, its explicit authorization to officials to refrain from punishment eliminates any conceivable doubt
about the legality of their actions when they apply the terms of the
exemptions in a proper manner.1 6
14 Considering the "necessity" defense as involving justified departures from rules by citizens, Mortimer and Sanford Kadish draw a much sharper distinction between it and the
other justification defenses, placing emphasis on the manner in which the defense effectively makes the court a legislator for specific cases. See M. KADiSH & S. KADISH, DiscRETION TO DISOBEY 120-27 (1973).
15 Constitutional provisions concerning the distribution of power among the branches of
government do not generally correspond with moral rights. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,
cl. 3. Other constitutional provisions involve moral rights not to be subjected to forms of
treatment by the government, but do not typically support private claims to engage in proscribed behavior. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (unreasonable searches). Among the standards that do support such claims, some require comparisons between how the complainant
is treated and how someone else is treated. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. amends. XIV, § 1, I (the
equal protection clause and, in certain applications, the free speech and free exercise
clauses). Questions of comparative treatment are only of peripheral relevance in this essay.
Is When judges use an exemption to cover cases to which it plainly does not apply, they
engage in nullification of the law, a subject considered in a later section. See note 118 infra
and accompanying text. Judges may also exceed their legal authority without realizing that
they are doing so when they engage in interpretive exercises that they mistakenly believe
are proper. How the boundaries of interpretive authority are to be defined and when
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The "Necessity" Justification

Under the "necessity" justification, the law-applier decides
whether an actor who has violated a rule of criminal law is nevertheless justified, and therefore free of criminal liability, because his
conduct was required to prevent an evil greater than that against
which the criminal prohibition was directed. This justification, also
called the "choice of evils '1 7 defense or the "norm of the lesser
evil," 18 is the only general justification. In its basic conception, the
defense is responsive to Aristotle's observation that about some
matters the law cannot speak both universally and correctly;1
however many specific justifications are provided, occasions will
remain when application of a general rule of criminal liability will
yield inappropriate results. Although, as Learned Hand said, the
defense "makes the judge [or jury] ad hoc a legislature, ' 20 it does
contain guiding criteria. So conceived, the principle of justification
is not intended to encourage some other body to second-guess
judgments made by the legislature, but rather to provide an opportunity for supplementary, particularistic judgments that are be21
yond legislative capacity.
Although "necessity" has been part of the common law of justification, 22 relatively few reported cases have involved the defense,
and its dimensions are not precisely marked out in jurisdictions in
which it has not received statutory formulation. Issues about the
defense are most clearly seen with reference to a codified version,
and I have chosen that of the Model Penal Code, which has exercised a substantial influence on recent state codes.2 3 When the defense is statutory, a sharp distinction exists between broad legislative decisions about relevant criteria and the responsibilities of
breaches of these boundaries should be characterized as failures to perform legal duties are
subjects beyond the scope of this essay.
17 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Off. Draft 1962).
1 See M. KADISH & S. KADiSH, supra note 14, at 120.
1 ARISTOTLE, ETiCA NicomAcEas

2:

Book X, part 9 (W. Ross trans. 1925).

ALI, MIUTEs oF THE CouNcn. 209 (1958).

21 But cf. Comment, The Law of Necessity as Applied in the Bisbee DeportationCase, 3
AEmz. L. REv. 264, 267 (1961) (in 1919, judge said the law of necessity as laid down by
existing authorities is based upon "natural rights" and "cannot be taken away by statute").
" But see GREAT BRrrAiN LAw COMMSSION REPORT ON DEFENSES OF GENERAL APPLICATION
No. 83, at 19-20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as REPORT] (finding it doubtful whether the defense exists at present in England).
23 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.05(2) (McKinney 1975).
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those who interpret and apply the criteria that the legislature has
established. Existing law constrains those who apply the criteria.
Within constitutional limits, the legislature is left free to alter the
standard, although wise legislators, attentive to the values of continuity over time and consonancy among various norms in the
same system, can ill afford to disregard the dimensions of existing
norms. I shall concentrate mainly on the question of desirable legislative choice for the necessity defense. Passing over questions of
interpretation and application that the necessity defense raises in
common with other statutes, I also address an issue it presents
with particular sharpness: the manner in which the law-applier is
to weigh competing evils.2
Section 3.02 of the Model Penal Code reads as follows:
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a
harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by
the law defining the offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the
specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification
25
claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
I shall first examine briefly the major features of the defense as
contained in section 3.02, comparing it with some alternative possibilities; then consider the place the defense occupies in the criminal law and some special problems that it raises; and finally evaluate whether it should be altered or abandoned.
The Model Code follows earlier law in requiring that the conduct
in question be thought necessary to avoid the evil; if the actor supposes only that his criminal conduct is one of a number of possible

UThose applying the law are also called upon by other statutory formulations to weigh
evils. Concepts of recklessness and negligence, among others, require such endeavors. My
suggestions about weighing evils under the necessity defense may thus have broader
relevance.
25 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (Off. Draft 1962). I have omitted subsection (2) which
deals with situations in which the actor is reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring the choice of evils or in his appraisal of the necessity for his conduct. My

discussion does not include these features, on which, it should be noted, the Model Penal
Code differs significantly from some other formulations.
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means or may be potentially conducive to avoiding the evil, his
breach of the law's prohibitions is not warranted. Many formulations include a requirement that the evil to be avoided be imminent,2 6' but the Model Code does not, on the view that, however
hard establishing the fact may be, if a present law violation is genuinely necessary to avoid a future harm, it is as justifiable as an
action to avoid an immediate harm. Unlike some formulations, section 3.02 neither demands that the evil to be avoided be very serious nor bars the defense to those who have committed acts as
grave as homicide.27 The idea here is that if only a slight crime is
involved, say ordinary trespass, avoidance of something less than a
serious evil might provide ample justification, and if the evil to be
avoided is indeed extremely serious, say multiple loss of life, even a
grave crime causing the death of one innocent life may be justified.
The Model Code provisions cover situations of choice created by
human agency (e.g., A's threat to kill C unless B steals) as well as
those created by natural causes (e.g., fire or flood). By barring invocation of the defense if the situation is dealt with by other, more
specific defenses or if a legislative purpose of exclusion otherwise
plainly appears, the section makes clear that the defense is not intended as a mechanism for second guessing legislative decisions.
Whereas the actor's own estimate of the necessity to avoid an evil
controls, the Model Code follows the common law and other statutory standards in leaving the weighing of evils up to the law-applying agency. The defense is successful only if the evil to be avoided
is judged to be greater than the evil that the violated criminal law
is designed to prevent, 8 but the Model Code does not require, as
does New York, that the avoided evil "clearly outweigh" the other
29
evil.
The Model Code standard is decidedly consequentialist and in at
least two possible respects may call for evaluation that differs
24 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.47 (West
1958).
" See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.47 (West 1958).
28 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(i)(a) (Off. Draft 1962). This standard is meant to be interpreted with reference to evils and risks in particular situations. One evil to be prevented by
laws against driving very fast is loss of life, but if speed is necessary to save the life of one
passenger, the evil to be avoided outweighs the slight risk of life caused by the particular
instance of fast driving.
" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05(2) (McKinney 1975).
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somewhat from the evaluation that might be made if the law-applier, having determined that the act was necessary to avoid the
evil in question, were asked simply to decide if the actor's behavior
was morally justified. The standard does not leave room for the
actor to say that although on balance his conduct caused more evil
than it avoided, it was nevertheless justified because of some special responsibility he had to the person who would have been
harmed had he obeyed the criminal law. That is, it does not allow
what have been called agent-relative justifications, which are part
of many persons' moral standards;3 0 an actor cannot successfully
argue, for example, that special family obligations justified his
helping a brother avoid arrest or his saving the lives of his own
family by sacrificing a greater number of lives of innocent strangers. From the law's point of view, avoidance of arrest is an evil,
not a good; and the loss of five innocent lives is a greater evil than
the loss of three innocent lives. Second, section 3.02 does not recognize absolute moral prohibitions of a nonconsequentialist sort.
Many people agree with the traditional Roman Catholic position
that the intentional taking of innocent life is never justified.3 1
Most instances in which section 3.02 envisages the justified commission of acts that cause the loss of innocent life may also be justified under the principle of "double effect." That principle, commonly accepted by those who believe that the intentional taking of
innocent life is always wrong, permits death as a virtually certain
but unintended consequence. 2 When a mountaineer cuts the rope
that attaches him to a companion who has fallen over a precipice
and whom it is impossible to save, or when an engineer diverts a
flood to save a town knowing that the inhabitants of a farm will be
inundated, loss of life is an unintended, although almost inevitable,
consequence. Because the section makes the magnitude of harm
crucial, 83 however, it would also justify acts that would be immoral
under the double effect analysis, as when townspeople kill their
mayor (who is in hiding) under the credible threat by a foreign
30 Under the defense of duress, however, special relationships may be relevant to whether
an actor could reasonably have been expected to resist coercion.
"
For a strong defense of that position in terms of a theory of moral rights, see J.

MURPHY,

supra note 11, at 3-25.

See generally J. MAcm, ETHCS 160-68 (1977).
One might argue that the harm is greater because the act violates an absolute moral
prohibition, but that would be to distort the ordinary sense of harm.
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invader that everyone in the town will be destroyed unless that is
done. Cast in terms of justification, the section leaves no special
place for claims of moral right. An actor cannot argue that though
his conduct did not prevent any greater evil, his disregard of the
evil meant to be prevented by the law was allowable in the circumstances because his behavior was within the ambit of a moral right.
When one conceives of the defense as a particularizing supplement to legislative decision and asks whether behavior in individual circumstances is warranted, the Code's outlines of the defense
seem about right. Any imminence requirement would be superfluous in most cases and uncalled for in the rare instance when necessity could be shown to avoid more distant evils. One's act is no less
justified if one is the innocent subject of human coercion than if
one is the subject of natural catastrophe. The principle of general
justification, if sound, is not limited to situations in which serious
evils are avoided or less than grave evils caused. Though the law
recognizes agent-relative responsibilities in many instances-for
example, in the rules conferring parental authority and in the law
of privileges-it does not ordinarily permit what would be criminal
violations of the rights and interests of outsiders in the performance of responsibilities owed to a small class of insiders. One pervading influence of the criminal law is to encourage people to respect the fundamental interests of strangers, and creation of the
possibility of ad hoc exceptions to the principle that the interests
of others deserve respect equal to the interests of one's family
members would be ill-advised. In most instances, the legislature,
by making a class of behavior criminal, has implicitly rejected any
claims of moral right that are independent of the evils avoided.
That is to say, in passing laws against drug use or consensual homosexual acts, the legislature has decided that individuals do not
have a moral right to engage in such behavior. Although it is conceivable that an actor might be in the position of saying, "I have a
moral right in this situation that is not of the sort the legislature
meant to reject," plausible assertions of this sort" will be much
less frequent than the parallel assertions about moral justification.
34 Some conscientious objector claims would fall into this category; these are treated below. See notes 63-78 infra and accompanying text. One might view claims about obligations
to family members as implicit claims of right to act on their behalf, but these claims would
still be subject to the analysis suggested above.
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A general justification that does not allow review of legislative
judgment is probably correct in excluding such claims.
The apparent rejection of absolute moral prohibitions may be
more debatable. A believer in such prohibitions might argue that
the legislature should preclude employment of the justification
defense when specified absolute moral standards are violated or
that those applying the law should at least have the opportunity to
reject the defense when they believe such standards have been
transgressed. 5 My own view is that in a society in which no consensus exists about an alternative moral principle, acts that
foreseeably have the consequence of effecting a net avoidance of
relevant evils should be considered justified as far as the law is
concerned. In practical terms, this position does not represent
adoption of the utilitarian approach in favor of more absolutist
standards, because the actor who adheres to any absolute standard
of the sort commonly proposed will not (at least in the cases I can
imagine) engage in behavior for which criminal liability will be imposed under the penal law. What the justification defense does, in
effect, is to place the actor who chooses to effect a net saving of
lives on a parity with the actor who observes the absolute
standard.
I recognize that some will not be persuaded by my position, believing that the utilitarian approach should not be afforded the
foothold that a formulation like that of the Model Code gives it. If
they are right, in principle the best disposition would be for the
legislature to address the problem and preclude violation of absolute standards. As.I have argued, however, the cases in which behavior might be justified under the Model Code standard and not
under "double effect" analysis are rare. Moreover, defining the behavior that is not to be allowed is no easy task; plainly it is not
sufficient just to bar the defense in homicide cases, because a substantial percentage of those very few cases will be ones in which
death is an unintended but certain consequence, and the actor's
behavior will not have violated most versions of absolute moral
3 One passage in the original commentary to the Model Penal Code suggests the appropriateness of such an inquiry under the Code's standard. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). The passage, however, is in severe tension with other
passages indicating that lives are to count equally and that a net saving of lives is justified
within the compass of § 3.02. See id. § 3.02, Comment 3.
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standards. Thus, although leaving the matter to those who apply
the law introduces the disturbing possibility of discrepancies, perhaps even the absolutist should recognize the unprofitability of attempted legislative definition of absolute principles, and settle for
a formulation that allows the law-appliers to reject claims that are
believed to run afoul of those principles.
Some of the Model Code's criteria that appear plainly preferable
to the alternatives at the straightforward level of analysis thus far
employed may be deemed more questionable when some complex
difficulties with the defense are considered, and I shall turn to
these below. First, however, I want to consider related problems
not resolved by the Model Code-what is to be the agency of law
application and what criteria is that agency to use in balancing
evils. To oversimplify, application of the standard requires factual
judgment (what the actor believed about the relevant external
facts 6 and the consequences of his conduct) 7 and evaluation
(comparison of the relevant evils). The whole standard might be
treated as involving a mixed question of law and fact, like whether
a confession is "coerced" or a book "obscene," and committed either to judge or jury, or the evaluative component might be given
to the judge and the factual components to the jury.3 8 Some older
formulations of the necessity defense assume that its application is
up to the jury,3 9 and that approach has been defended recently on
the ground that a body "representative of the community should
be allowed to decide the issue of relative values. ' 40 Nevertheless,
36 Under some formulations, what would count are the perceptions of a reasonable person,
not the actual perceptions of the actor.
37 "Necessity" is not a simple factual inquiry, but involves an estimation of hypothetical
possibilities and an evaluation of tolerable risk. Suppose, for example, an accident victim's
life is saved after the actor drives him at 70 m.p.h. to the hospital, and the actor testifies
that he thought there was a substantial, but less than even, chance of death if he observed
the speed limit. In passing on "necessity," a jury would have to decide whether such a risk
should have been taken.
3 This alternative may present some administrative difficulties. If the actor asserts that
his act was necessary to avoid various potential evils, say damage to the lives and property
of many people, the jury may believe that only some of these were genuinely threatened,
and the judge may be hard put to indicate precisely what combinations of potential evils
would be sufficiently great to justify the act. For an illustration of such complex assertions
about avoided evils, see the summary of facts and claims concerning the Bisbee Deportation
case in Comment, supra note 21, at 264-65.
3" Id. at 273, 277.
40Arnolds & Garland, The Defense of Necessity in CriminalLaw: The Right to Choose
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New York and the states following it have explicitly committed
that determination to the judge.4 1 In large part, the issue turns on
how expansive a defense is desired, the assumption being that
judges will be more constrained (and perhaps more consistent)
than juries. But the agency to which evaluation is committed is
also interestingly related to the criteria of evaluation. Mortimer
and Sanford Kadish speak of the determination as whether "on
balance it is better in terms of the ultimate ends of the criminal
law for a person to violate a given rule than obey it." '4 2 If the judge
is to weigh the conflicting evils, one might plausibly argue that he
should be guided mainly by the law's weighting of relevant interests, drawing subtly, and perhaps even unconsciously, from related
legal standards. In this view, the principle of general justification
could be perceived as a reference away from a narrow and explicit
rule, the violated criminal statute, to the whole body of the law. If
the judge finds that he must go outside the law in making his comparison, 43 he is presumably to be guided mainly by community
standards, insofar as these are identifiably different from his own
standards for weighing the evils involved. 4 Obviously, jurors are
not trained to make such evaluations mainly by reference to peripherally relevant legal norms; in cases of difficulty, they will
compare evils as representatives of community sentiment, with
each juror relying initially on his own judgment and then perhaps
properly bending to some extent if he finds that his judgment is
out of line with that of his fellow jurors. In any event, the proposition that the law in some sense itself supplies the material for the
evaluation that the necessity defense requires is closely tied to the
assumption that the balancing of evils will be done by the judge.
One who wants to think intelligently about the desirable scope
of a principle of general justification must understand its place
among other rules and practices in the system of criminal justice.
The defense is crucial in very few cases, both because of the range
of more specific justifications and because of police and
the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 296 (1974).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05(2) (McKinney 1975).
M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 14, at 120.
43 Of course, in practice the judge will not be able to separate clearly the implications of
other legal materials, extralegal community standards, and his own independent judgments.
"A judge in such cases is engaging in an enterprise similar to the filling in of other open41
4

ended legal standards supplied by legislators.
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prosecutorial choices not to proceed in most cases covered by the
defense. Further, when the defense reaches choices made under
threats, as does the Model Code version, it overlaps substantially
with the defense of duress, which excuses an actor who submits to
coercion that a person of reasonable firmness would have been unable to resist.45 Finally, if the defense were abolished, instances of
jury nullification and lenient sentencing would aid actors who
might now claim its justification.
Thus, the defense of necessity does not have tremendous practical significance. Yet it fills important offices. It serves as a safeguard against prosecutorial abuse, and even if prosecutorial policy
is enlightened, actors who are genuinely justified in what they do
should have the satisfaction of thinking they have acted appropriately under the law rather than having to depend on the grace of
the prosecutor or even the grudging acknowledgment, represented
by a finding of duress, that their submission to pressure was excusable. Moreover, for those cases in which the asserted justifying
facts are in doubt, the crime is very serious, or the balance of relevant values is extremely difficult, formal adjudication may well be
preferable to placing on the prosecutor the great weight of deciding
whether a possibly justified actor will be punished. Despite its limited impact, therefore, the defense belongs in the criminal law unless its drawbacks are too great.
It would certainly be a drawback if the existence of the defense
encouraged actors to violate the law without sufficient assessment
of whether their actions really were necessary to avoid greater
evils. As far as private actors and ordinary circumstances are concerned, this possibility is implausible in the extreme, 46 because
such a rarely used defense is unlikely to have a significant effect on
how private persons react to emergency situations. The concern,
however, may have greater relevance for two situations discussed
below. 47 Another possible drawback is that the defense is too openended, failing to provide fair warning and lending itself to uneven
4" See MODEL PE.NAL CODE §

2.09 (Off. Draft 1962).

" A related argument would be that those who threaten others may find less resistance if
a justification is available for those who give in, and that threats that generate choices between evils will thereby be encouraged. It is not likely that possible escape from liability has
much effect on those who are threatened; in any event, so long as the defense of duress
remains available, elimination of the necessity defense would hardly matter in this respect.
47 See notes 48-52 infra and accompanying text.
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administration. If we assume that the defense will infrequently be
relied upon in advance (or otherwise lead actors to engage in behavior that they would not have engaged in but for the defense),
actors will rarely be put in a worse position because of the defense,
which provides immunity when none would otherwise exist. Thus,
the fair warning point has much less force than it would in the
context of basic definitions of criminal behavior. A degree of
vagueness is tolerable and, indeed, necessary when a subject does
not lend itself to more precise definition. Moreover, the answers to
questions of general justification are not quite so uncertain as the
open-ended phraseology might lead one to think. Many questions
about necessity and relative values will, after all, appear relatively
simple (although cases in which the actor's behavior is undeniably
justified will not often get to court). Insofar as uneven administration remains a concern, that risk constitutes one argument for giving the application of the defense to judges rather than jurors. In
any event, abolition of the defense on that ground would be largely
self-defeating, since unevenness would remain for those cases in
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, jury nullification, and sentencing decisions.
In three special circumstances, the drawbacks of a defense as
broad as the Model Code formulation may be more substantial.
With respect to certain acts that, viewed individually, may seem
justified, the damage to legal clarity and general deterrence that
could be caused by successful employment of the defense may tell
against its application. For example, if one is threatened with a
serious assault by a fellow prisoner and authorities cannot provide
adequate protection against such assaults, escape can perhaps be
seen as a necessary lesser evil to prevent the assault. But if prisoners who escape are subsequently returned to the same institutions,
the level of freedom from assault will not rise much if the defense
is recognized. Because the closed community of fellow prisoners is
likely to learn of such rulings, allowing the defense may well encourage more escapes, and the burden upon juries or judges assessing the adequacy of in-prison protection and the existence and
credibility of purported threats of assault would be formidable.
One might reasonably conclude that, although the evil of escape is
less than the evil of assault and escape is sometimes necessary to
avoid assault, the defense nevertheless should not be admitted for
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such situations.4 8 Ideally, the law-applier's endeavor to weigh evils
could take into account the prospects for genuine relief from
avoided evils, future administrative difficulties, and overall deterrent effects, but that is obviously a hard task for a judge and an
inappropriate one for jurors. In any event, by focusing attention on
the particular instance rather than on a general class of actions,
the Model Code and other formulations do not explicitly encourage
such a broader view.
A different problem arises when an actor claims that violation of
one law (e.g., a traffic regulation) was warranted as a protest
against another law or government policy. Courts have not been
receptive to such claims, 4 9 and perhaps the necessity requirement
effectively precludes them, because the actor may have difficulty
showing that his acts were necessary to avoid the evil to which he
objects. It is not inconceivable, however, that a jury might be persuaded that such acts of disobedience by the defendant and others
are required to stop some evil (e.g., the Vietnamese War); even the
imminence requirement of many formulations need not be an absolute bar, for illegal acts of protest are usually addressed at what
the actors consider to be a continuing evil. Yet it hardly seems an
appropriate task for judges or juries to determine whether the
harm of one law or policy is so great that citizens are justified in
causing the harm another law is aimed at preventing.50 Moreover,
such a task conflicts with a conception of the defense as particularizing general legislative aims1
Illegal protest and even acts like escapes might be considered
precluded from the defense on the ground that permitting a justification would not be consonant with the general purposes that the
8 Compare State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo.) (rejecting defense), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1073 (1971), with People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974) (acknowledging defense), aff'd, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975). The dangers of recognizing the defense might be avoided by a requirement that escapees turn themselves in at the
earliest safe opportunity. See People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110

(Dist Ct. App. 1974).
4' See Arnolds & Garland, supra note 40, at 299-301.
The New York requirement that the evil avoided "clearly outweigh" the evil sought to

be prevented, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05(2) (McKinney 1975), would be hard to meet in
such cases.
51 This point applies straightforwardly only to protests against legislative actions. The
legislature need not, of course, endorse every controversial executive policy, but with limited
exceptions, it has the capability to alter those policies.
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legislature seeks to pursue. Much can be said for some latitude of
judicial interpretation to deal with these matters, but the Model
Code formulation is not particularly well suited for it. It bars the
defense only when the legislature has provided other explicit exceptions or defenses or when a legislative purpose to exclude the
justification "otherwise plainly appear[s]." 52 It would take a
strained interpretation to say that a purpose to exclude "plainly
appears" for illegal protests and an even more strained interpretation to reach that conclusion about escapes.
Probably the greatest danger with the defense is its possible use
when officials or outraged citizens take action against unpopular
minorities, a danger sharply evidenced by its submission to the
jury in the Bisbee Deportation case.53 In that case, a posse had
kidnapped over one thousand striking I.W.W. members and sympathizers and transported them out of the state, subsequently
claiming necessity to protect the lives and property of local residents. Blatantly illegal actions by officials may, in a time of continuing national and international crisis, be defended as necessary
to prevent grave harms to the country, and the officials who raise
such defenses will not always be as tarnished as were the members
of the Nixon administration by the time they got to trial. In contrast with use of the defense for isolated private acts, a prominent
official's successful invocation of the defense, and even his employment of this theory in public claims that criticized actions were
warranted, might affect the inclinations of other officials to observe legal limits.
The Model Code partly addresses this problem about public officials by barring the general justification when other justifications
are relevant, but the apparent result is somewhat paradoxical. Official duty is a separate justification, 5 ' so when the official is acting
like an official, but oversteps the limits of his authority, he must
do without the choice-of-evils argument. 5 If his action is blatantly
illegal, however, and if he lays no claim to official authority in the
usual sense, despite having relied upon his position within the govMODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(l)(c) (Off. Draft 1962).
See Comment, supra note 21, at 279.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.03 (Off. Draft 1962).
55However, what is a proper exercise of official duty will often depend on the exigencies
of a situation.
"
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ernment when performing the action, then he may be free to claim
choice of the lesser evil as would a private individual. 6 It might be
preferable to bar this defense altogether for officials who act under
the color of authority in any sense, 57 particularly because the official authority justification is sufficiently flexible to cover almost all
defensible acts by officials.
This approach would not, of course, solve the problem of private
mob action against feared minorities.5 8 Are there any principles
that might be employed to preclude the defense in such situations?
Conceivably the defense should not be allowed when private citizens take upon themselves the responsibilities of government officers, at least when the government has had time to act. Such a
rule, however, would eliminate the defense not only when a private
mob overreacts to some supposed danger, but also when private
persons respond with minimum force to a real danger that officials
refuse to recognize, are too frightened to meet, or are unable to
contain. Moreover, if private persons were not allowed to do the
things that public officials are supposed to do (such as confine
dangerous pesons), it would be anomalous to allow them to respond to a threat by harming the interests of an innocent person if
prompt and effective official action could have stymied the person
making the threat. Yet a broader principle that would bar the defense whenever a prompt plea to officials could have provided relief from feared dangers if officials had responded effectively
would leave some persons who accurately perceive that officials
cannot or will not protect them against serious threatened harms
without the justification. In short, it is not easy to develop a sen" The facts of the Bisbee Deportation case, State v. Wootton, Crim. No. 2685 (Cochise
County Ct., Ariz. Sept. 13, 1919), are receptive to this analysis. The court instructed the jury
that the sheriff who organized the posse of more than 1000 to round up the strikers did so
without official authority, but rather acted as an individual and as a member of the community and was subject to the principles governing private actors. See Comment, supra note
21, at 272.
" The principles governing "color of law" and "state action" in civil rights cases might
profitably be employed by analogy here. See generally Lewis, The Meaning of State Action,
60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960); Comment, The Civil Rights Act and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALIF.
L. REv. 145 (1961); Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REv. 840 (1974).
"Nor would it necessarily settle the claims of private actors who participated with officials. See generally Note, Section 1983 Liability of PrivateActors Who Conspire With Immune State Officials, 80 CoLuM. L. REv. 802 (1980).
69 Such persons, however, could often claim duress. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Off.
Draft 1962).
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sible principle that would prevent misuse of the defense by those
who take action against unpopular groups without also preventing
its use by persons whose claim of justification is appealing.
These various difficulties do provide arguments against having
the defense against choice of evils"0 or for narrowing the defense
more than the Model Code has done. They may also be used to
support the position of the Brown Commission that the defense
should be left to whatever common-law status it enjoys rather than
reduced to codified form. 1 My own view is that despite these
problems the defense should be retained, that codification is desirable to supply reasonably clear guiding criteria, and that the difficulties can be largely met within the basic approach of the Model
Code by a combination of moderate variations in statutory language and sensitive judicial interpretation.
Is some much broader defense called for-one that overleaps the
confinement of legislative judgment? Should judges or juries62 be
able to decide that an action is legally justified even though it constitutes behavior that the legislature has really meant to proscribe?
I think not, primarily because whatever general authority the jury
should have to acquit guilty persons, a subject we consider in the
context of jury nullification, it should not be told that if it thinks
that, on balance, the defendant's acts were justified (or protected
by moral rights), it should conclude that the defendant has not
really violated the law. Such a practice would thrust an unpredictable wild card into the administration of much of the substantive
criminal law and would open up criminal trials to a congeries of
evidence and argument about the merits of assailants and victims
and about various moral claims. Such broad review would not only
reflect a diminished sense of legislative authority, it might also indirectly encourage irresponsible legislative action. All these difficulties might be justified if there were deep fear of legislative
abuse in defining crimes and no other effective checking mechanism. Suffice it to say that, in the United States, a written constitution with judicial review provides a more structured form of re"0The Law Commission in Great Britain has in fact recommended its elimination. See
REPORT, supra note 22, at 19-32.
61 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT § 601,
Comment (1971).
62 For this purpose, juries would plainly be more appropriate unless judges were instructed to employ natural-law principles or the standards of justice in civilized societies.
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view that reaches most of the gross abuses legislatures might
perpetrate.
B.

Conscientious Objector Exemptions

In exempting conscientious objectors from generally imposed obligations, society does not make the judgment that the position of
the objectors is correct, but rather that some accommodation is
called for because of the objectors' strong moral convictions. Most
legislative interest and public attention have focused on employment of such a principle to excuse persons from military service.
Starting with a brief examination of the law's operation in that
context, I inquire whether moral claims other than "conscientious
objection" should be recognized as a basis for exemption, whether
practices of accommodation should be developed that do not depend upon official identification of eligible individuals, and
whether the idea of accommodation to strong moral convictions
warrants expansion to other areas. I address the question of exemption mainly as one of legislative choice; I do not discuss how
officials should apply and interpret the statutory guidelines that
they are given, assuming that the exercise of official responsibilities here is similar to that under other kinds of statutes. To a limited extent, exemptions are constitutionally required, 63 but in this
section, as elsewhere in the essay, I do not discuss how judges
should interpret the Constitution.
In the United States, an exemption from combatant military service has historically been given to religious pacifists-persons who
believe they would violate fundamental religious and moral duties
if they engaged in armed conflict. From the beginning of World
War II, the exemption was not limited to members of pacifist
sects; and by ingenious disregard of statutory language and legislative intent, the Supreme Court managed to conclude that Congress
had drawn no line between traditional religious believers and other
pacifists." The Court, however, upheld a different distinction
" For cases that establish that conscientious objection rooted in traditional religious beliefs can have constitutional relevance, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); In re
Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (per curiam), on remand, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), a majority of the Court read a "Supreme Being" clause out of the statute. See id. at 164-65. In Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333 (1970), a plurality effectively treated any conscientious objection to service as being
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drawn by Congress, that between those who are conscientiously opposed to participation in all wars and those whose objection to military service is based on opposition to a particular war. 5
The arguments against criminal punishment for pacifists who
are unwilling to serve in the armed forces are powerful. No one
who understands their position would condemn them as morally
blameworthy, and the penal goals of incapacitation, reform, and
specific deterrence are irrelevant. If some wavering pacifists are
successfully coerced into the army by a threat of punishment, they
hardly constitute ideal prospects for soldiering, and few can feel
comfortable with the idea of a liberal society confining as public
enemies those who cannot be brought to perform acts of violence
they believe are utterly abhorrent. Although many of the usual
reasons for punishment do not apply, others do. Some of these are
tied to problems of identification to which I turn below.6 Apart
from those problems, the major argument against granting an exemption is one of fairness. As citizens, the argument goes, pacifists
should share in the obligations imposed by the government, especially since they, like others, will stand to benefit from the security
that military forces give to the country.
The point about fairness is complicated. Certainly, it is not unfair to exempt from generally shared burdens those who are physically incapable of performing their part. In addition, it is not unfair to exempt those who are probably physically capable of
performing, but only at extraordinary physical sacrifice (e.g., if six
people are available and four are needed to push a car up the hill,
the recent victim of a heart attack is excused). Ordinarily, at least,
it is not unfair to exempt persons whose abhorrence of performing
an act is extreme, on the view that the sacrifice demanded of them
would be greater than the sacrifice demanded of others. It oversimplifies the issue, however, to ask if an exemption would be unfair;
when alternative burdens are placed upon those who are excused
that roughly approximate the burdens of those who perform the
primary obligation, the system is more fair than when those who
"religious" within the statute's meaning. See id. at 342-44. Justice Harlan joined the Welsh
plurality's disposition of the case on the ground that the congressionally intended distinc-

tion between religious and nonreligious objectors was unconstitutional. Id. at 345 (Harlan,
J., concurring).
es See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 448 (1971).
" See text accompanying note 68 infra.
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are exempted get a free ride.
If ways of equalizing burdens are both practical and morally acceptable, a system of exemptions is unfair to the degree that it
fails to make use of equalizing devices.67 Criminal punishment
might be viewed as reflecting and serving a principle of fairness
toward those who submit. Whatever actual fairness may require,
punishment may provide reassurances of fairness to those who perform the obligation and who may not fully recognize the valid reasons that would underlie exemptions for others they wrongly deem
to be cowards or shirkers. Criminal punishment, however, is hardly
the best way to equalize burdens; indeed, it is a morally unacceptable way if alternatives are available. The American system has
gone much of the way to meet the problems of fairness and perceived fairness by requiring noncombatant duty of those whose opposition has been limited to combatant roles and by requiring alternative civilian service of those opposed to any form of military
duty. The period of service and pay for civilian service have been
roughly equal to that of compulsory military duty, but civilian service has not involved the difficult living conditions, prolonged separation from loved ones, or risk of death characteristic of wartime
military life, so in important respects it has been less onerous. On
the other hand, conscientious objectors have not been eligible for
veterans' benefits that enhance the overall attractiveness of military service. Overall, though alternative service has not wholly
eliminated the inequality of burdens, it has certainly reduced inequality enough to make blanket criminal punishment an unacceptable device for achieving fairness.
So far, I have assumed that the class of people actually excused
would coincide with those for whom the exemption is afforded, but
the price of an exemption involving a system of identification will
be extension to some fraudulent claimants. Their avoidance of the
67 In situations where many duties are undoubtedly to be imposed by central authority
(e.g., jobs on a camping expedition), and one job (e.g., killing and preparing meat) is highly
unpleasant for all and virtually unacceptable for some (e.g., it makes them physically ill),
those excused from this duty should be assigned some other unpleasant duty instead (e.g.,
taking care of garbage). In public situations, a constant question about moral acceptability
is whether the state is ever justified in intervening in one person's life if the only, or main,
justification for the interference with his liberty is to equalize the burden given another for
a reason that does justify state intervention. At least when the excused person would otherwise have had to bear the "primary" burden, I believe such intervention is acceptable as the
cost of a fair exemption.
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obligation is obviously unfair to those who do submit. Thus, in respect to those who might successfully obtain the exemption but are
not genuine objectors, punishment of all objectors does serve general deterrence, fairness, and perceived fairness. The reasons for
punishment on these grounds become stronger as the class of people to be excused becomes harder to identify. When application of
the criteria of exemption turns on the claimant's sincerity and
level of moral intensity, identification of genuine objectors is far
from simple, and it becomes more complicated as the test broadens
to include more than adherents of traditional pacifist sects. For
nonpacifists opposed to participation in particular wars, drawing
the line between genuine conscientious objectors and others would
be even more difficult, and the refusal of Congress so to extend the
exemption was understandable (though on balance mistaken in my

view).68

One broad question about exemptions from generally imposed
obligations is whether the class to benefit should be larger than
those accurately described as conscientious objectors, perhaps including all those who think an alternative course of action is morally preferable or within their moral rights. The question needs to
be considered both in terms of theory-who ideally should get an
exemption?-and in terms of practicality-how would a more
broadly formulated exemption work? I shall focus on military service, because in that context some accommodation to genuine conscientious objectors is most plainly warranted. Should a young person be exempted from compulsory military service because he
thinks that a moral obligation to his family outweighs the country's need, that he can serve his country better by continuing as a
school teacher, or that society has no right to have a draft? The
answer, I believe, is clearly "no." The moral judgment that the
standard would require of individuals would be extremely difficult,
forcing them, for example, to decide just how much weight to give
to the social judgment reflected in the law and the actual military
needs of the country. The honest judgment of many people about
what is morally best or the scope of their moral rights would be so
heavily tinctured by self-interest that compulsory military service
with such an exemption would not be much different from a volun" See Greenawalt, All or Nothing At All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 31.
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teer army. In any event, the judgment of society reflected in compulsory military service should count for something more than it
would under this scheme. Society properly requires people to do
things other than what they regard as morally best when a corporate determination has been made that their contribution is
needed for the general safety and welfare. If such an expansion of
the exemption still seemed attractive despite these objections, the
unavoidable problems of identification would defeat it as a practical plan, because others would be unable to tell if someone who
stated moral qualms about military service really thought that
other actions were morally preferable or that his rights were being
infringed.
The conclusion that all moral claims, of whatever variety, should
not be the basis for an exemption from military service highlights
the importance of the term "conscientious" in the phrase "conscientious objectors" and the centrality of any process of identification by which the state endeavors to separate the sheep from the
goats. The administrative problem is not only to figure out
whether a claimant is honest, but whether his honestly stated
moral convictions amount to a conscientious opposition. If the government must engage in this business, some process of classification that precedes potential criminal liability is desirable, but one
can hardly view with enthusiasm the history of selective service
board classification in this area. For many years, the difficulty was
that many sincere objectors were not believed and were denied the
exemption; as horror with the Vietnamese War spread, the courts'
requirements for denial became so rigorous that many dubious
claimants succeeded.
The inexorable difficulties of identification should lead us to
look very hard for alternatives. The volunteer army is, of course,
one such alternative, but if it is believed necessary to reinstate the
draft during some subsequent period, there is another alternative,
an alternative that can straightforwardly meet problems of fairness
and perceived fairness much better than any procedure of identification: self-selecting civilian service in lieu of military service. The
conditions of civilian service should be set in such a way that very
few other than those with strong moral objections would prefer it,
but anyone who wished should be permitted to choose it as an al-
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ternative to military service.6 9 For example, if alternate service involved equal pay and living conditions but duty of three or three
and one-half years instead of two, or one could choose between a
certainty of civilian service or a chance in a lottery of military service, ° most young persons would not choose civilian service. In the
United States, a draft with such an alternative would produce
ample military manpower. Identification difficulties would be eliminated, and because those in the army could themselves have chosen alternate service, they could have no sense of unfairness in relation to those making that choice. The only possible claim of
unfairness would be that those who chose civilian service because
they were conscientiously opposed to military service were being
made to suffer for that belief, 1 but this perspective misconceives
the issue. The conditions to which they would be subject would be
necessary to administer fairly an exemption from a generally imposed duty; though somewhat less favorable than the conditions of
military service, the conditions of civilian service would be more
favorable than those attaching to criminal conviction and
confinement.
If an exemption for persons who are conscientiously opposed to
military service is sound policy, should accommodations also be
made for those who conscientiously oppose performance of other
legal obligations? This question has been given much less thought
than it deserves in liberal democracies. In the United States, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the free exercise clause of the
first amendment has created a limited conscientious objector principle of constitutional status. Persons whose religious beliefs forbid
jury service cannot be compelled to serve on juries;7 2 families who
are members of traditional sects that fervently believe that educa" Persons should also have an opportunity to select noncombatant military service.
Whether an effort would have to be made to make the length of service or other conditions
of that worse than the conditions for combatant service would depend upon the "normal"
conditions and risks of such service.
70 Standing alone, this opportunity for choice would not be enough, because people might
develop deep-felt objections to service after a lottery or even during military duty.
71 They might also object on the general "liberty" ground that compulsory service is not
justified at all except for military defense, but in this respect, the proposal does not differ
from the old alternative service. In both instances, the claim seems a weak one if the compulsory service is required for a fair exemption and is preferable to criminal punishment.
71 See In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (per curiam), on remand, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d
588 (1963).
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tion beyond an elementary level violates God's will and that provide an alternative form of community living that does not demand such education may not be compelled to send their children
to school beyond the eighth grade."' The United States, however, is
still a long way from adopting a general conscientious objector exemption from legal requirements, approximating what Thoreau
may have had in mind when he talked of a truly "enlightened
State," in which "the State comes to recognize the individual as a
higher and independent power, from which all its own power and
4
authority are derived, and treats him accordingly."'
We may begin with the proposition that when behavior causes or
threatens serious harm to persons or property the law should not
allow as an excuse the actor's strong moral compulsion to engage in
the behavior. Society cannot recognize the sovereignty of individual moral sentiments that are exercised to the detriment of the
rights of other individuals. Even if certain individuals are so firm
in their sense of moral rectitude that they cannot in fact be deterred by legal penalties, the law should not assume this to be the
case;75 in any event, such individuals need to be incapacitated if
their moral views will lead to repetitive infringements of rights.
The two kinds of crimes for which an exemption is arguably
more appropriate are ones imposing shared social burdens (e.g.,
military service, jury duty, payment of taxes) and ones based on
paternalistic judgments (e.g., that people should not use marijuana, that children should stay in school until they are sixteen).
The need for an exemption from other shared responsibilities, including tax burdens, is less compelling than the need for an exemption from military service. As far as I know, conscientious objection has never been recognized as a basis for refusing to pay
taxes. The government has means of collecting money without the
voluntary cooperation of the person owing taxes, and a taxpayer's
recalcitrant attitude does not impair the effectiveness of his taxes
the way that the recalcitrant attitude of a soldier might affect military peformance. Moreover, an exemption without alternatives
73 See

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

7" Thoreau, Resistance to Civil Government, in AESTHETIC PAPERs 189, 211 (E. Peabody

ed. 1849).
75 The law should not assume this to be the case, barring, of course, irresponsibility
caused by insanity.
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would be intolerable; others could not accept the idea that someone with supposed moral scruples had simply lifted a burden from
his shoulders that all find painful. But even if it does not portend
the horror that the pacifist may feel about the possibility of killing,
the collection of some taxes can cause intense indignity to those
who have some fundamental moral objection to compulsory payments to the government or to the manner in which the government is spending their money. Thus, there is good reason to ask
whether the principles governing exemptions from military service
deserve extension. I see no serious problem of feasibility in providing an alternative for most large taxes;7 6 either pay your taxes or

donate the amount of your owed taxes plus a substantial extra percentage (say twenty percent) to charity. Not many people would
wish to add twenty percent to their tax burden to avoid paying to
the government. Why should not society permit an exemption for
those who feel strongly enough to do so and who will instead pay
money for socially beneficial but privately conceived purposes?"
As to jury duty, the shared responsibility is so minor that few will
falsely claim intense moral scruples against service. Because alternative service for such a short period hardly seems feasible, and
because those who do participate on juries are unlikely to feel serious resentment against those excused on grounds of conscience,
the appropriate course seems simply to exempt those who claim to
be objectors.
Exemptions for conscientious objectors are not appropriate for
1 do not think any such plan is feasible for things like sales taxes.
7 The arguments in favor of some exemption are more fully developed in Comment, The
World Peace Tax Fund Act: Conscientious Objection for Taxpayers, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 76
(1979). The legislative proposal analyzed there would let taxpayers conscientiously opposed
to participation in war designate the percentage of their taxes that would otherwise go to
military expenditures to go instead to a World Peace Tax Fund devoted to purposes such as
nonviolent international solutions and disarmament. I think it is a inistake to limit an exemption to those who happen to be opposed to military expenditures, and the special fund
has the disquieting effect of seeming to label ordinary taxpayers as less concerned with
world peace. As the comment acknowledges, the practical effect of the plan from the government's point of view would probably be a bookkeeping one, not resulting in less expenditures for military purposes or more for peaceful purposes. Id. at 86-87. For a plan that does
not envision any serious identification effort, requiring merely a statement of conscientious
opposition, perhaps the choice to opt out should carry some cost to weed out the genuine
objectors in conscience from those who would simply feel more comfortable seeing their own
money go for disarmament than bombs and who might hope their participation would help
alter the emphases of government programs in the long run.
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most paternalistic laws. These laws are adopted with the knowledge that some people want to perform the forbidden acts, say use
of drugs. If many of them want badly to use the drugs, how would
it be decided who would get the exemption: those whose desire for
use is most intense? those who think they have a moral right to use
the drug? those who believe all paternalistic laws are unjustified?
That people in these classes exist is in itself a strong argument
against passing prohibitory legislation, but once the determination
is made that the reasons for passage are greater than the reasons
against, it is, with one exception, hard to conceive how one could
appropriately define a class whose claim to be excused on the basis
of belief should be honored. It is impossible to suppose that any
such line could be perceived as fair or be tolerably administered or
that some form of alternative service could be employed as an apt
substitute for a process of identification. The one exception to this
principle against accommodation may be in connection with corporate religious practices. That context may significantly reduce potential harm and provide an objective indication of the intensity of
belief that noncompliance is perceived as morally (or religiously)
required or strongly desirable. 8
C.

ConstitutionalRights

Persons who believe that their moral rights have been violated
by law or by other governmental action are often able to raise
plausible claims that what the government has done is unconstitutional. Like the "necessity" defense, a claim of unconstitutionality
allows the court to say that actions that appear to be illegal are not
so once the entire body of law is taken into account.79 Certain constitutional standards seem to call upon the courts to engage in
moral evaluations; other standards that are actually or apparently
more specific, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, are
grounded in assumptions about the moral rights of individuals.
The interpretive evolution of virtually all the individual rights
guarantees in the Constitution has been substantially influenced
by changing moral conceptions, a development that is perhaps
70 See, e.g., People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).

79 It is significant, however, that actions taken in violation of injunctions and, in some
circumstances, administrative orders may be considered illegal even if the directive violated
was itself unconstitutional. See, e.g, Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
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most sharply marked by the Supreme Court's announcement of a
constitutional right to abortion. 0
Obviously, the law provides the main criteria for judges interpreting the Constitution; the extent to which judges in these cases
properly go "outside" the law is beyond the scope of this article.
Although a court's judgment may be influenced by moral evaluation, rarely, if ever, is the determination a straightforward one
about moral acceptabilty or moral right; the court will be guided
by whatever implicit judgments of acceptability are contained in or
underlie the relevant constitutional provision and precedents interpreting it, and often it will grant considerable deference to the
judgments made by the political branches.
III. DECISIONS NOT TO PROSECUTE ACTORS FOR OFFENSES THEY
HAVE COMMITTED
Those who, out of moral conviction, behave in a way that would
ordinarily be illegal often do not have any legal defense. If their
cases went to trial, the facts accurately found, and the law correctly applied, they would be found guilty. Since certain officials,
however, have the authority to decline to move these cases forward, one manner in which the legal system can accommodate
moral claims to disobey the law is by inaction in the face of
violations.
A. Prosecutorialand Police Decisions Not to Proceed
When police decide not to arrest or initiate charges and prosecutors decide against pressing charges, their decisions are not formally conclusive-later criminal proceedings may still be
brought-but, for practical purposes, such decisions usually are final. According to tradition, and also according to statutory norm in
some jurisdictions, police and prosecutors are supposed to enforce
the law evenhandedly against all violators. Yet neither the police
nor prosecuting agencies process all the cases in which there is
probable cause of someone's guilt or even all the cases in which
there is enough evidence to make conviction highly likely if the
cases were brought to trial.81 The sometimes stated ideal of full
,0 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
81 See generally K. DAvis, DIsCRETIONRY JUSTCE 162-214 (1969); M. KADISH & S. KAD-
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enforcement cannot really be taken seriously by legislatures or by
other actors within the legal system. With full knowledge that
many cases are not carried forward, legislatures have failed to take
significant corrective action. They maintain laws (e.g., against jaywalking) that are the subject of blatant nonenforcement, and they
decline to devote the resources that would be necessary to approach full enforcement for the laws that now exist. Not only is it
impossible for police and prosecutors to proceed against all criminal offenders; prosecutors must rely heavily on negotiated guilty
pleas to lesser charges than the actual offenses would warrant, a
practice that is also at odds with any ideal of full enforcement.
When private individuals have sought to enforce the prosecutor's
duty to prosecute, they have almost inevitably been turned back,
leaving the prosecutor (and the police) unconstrained by any effective legal remedy. In short, the assumption of most actors within
the legal system and of the package of legal norms taken as a
whole is that no duty of full enforcement of all the criminal laws
exists. As to many laws, it is doubtful if there is any heavy presumption in favor of enforcement. For these laws at least, one may
speak of police and prosecutors as possessing an implicit delegated
discretion to decide whether to go forward. 82 Perhaps for more serious offenses, a presumption does exist in favor of enforcement,
but even then it is hard to describe a failure to proceed as a violation of any legal duty. Prosecutors, and perhaps the police, still
seem to have legal authority to refuse to take action. e
For our purposes, the similarities between police discretion not
to arrest or charge and prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute
are much more important than any differences, and therefore I
shall concentrate on prosecutorial authority, leaving unexamined
just what variations a fuller analysis of police authority might
yield. Prosecutors have many reasons for declining to proceed
against criminal offenders: they may think evidence insufficient for
a conviction, they may trade immunity for testimony against other
offenders, or they may follow a general policy of reduction of
ISH, supra note 14, at 73-85.
82

M. KADISH & S. KUsH, supra note 14, at 78-82.

One possibility is that with more serious offenses these officials are under authoritative
legal instructions to proceed but have authority within the law not to follow the instructions. Such a possibility is discussed more fully in connection with jury nullification. See
notes 103-17 infra and accompanying text.
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charges in return for guilty pleas. Our concern is limited to those
situations in which the prosecutor's failure to prosecute (or to
prosecute for a crime as serious as that actually committed) is
based on some judgment about the gravity of the offense committed or the character of the actor.
Given the vast array of criminal statutes in any jurisdiction and
limited prosecutorial resources, prosecutors are unable to proceed
vigorously against many petty offenses, but their discretion goes
well beyond assigning priority to cases on the basis of the gravity
of the legislative category into which the criminal act fits. The legislature's classifications must necessarily be crude, and within any
class of offense, some acts will be less serious than others. Although the taking of a single hotel towel is petty larceny, for example, it hardly warrants prosecution absent special circumstances.
Quite apart from resource problems, some instances of misbehavior
are so trivial that the formal condemnation of a criminal conviction is inappropriate, and the prosecutor may well assume that the
members of the legislature would take the same view. When resource problems, themselves largely attributable to the legislature,
are taken into account, the need to evaluate the seriousness of individual instances of misbehavior becomes more obvious.
Behavior can be, on balance, less serious than ordinary instances
of the offense either because the harm is relatively slight (e.g., the
hotel towel example) or because there is a countervailing good. In
this sense, driving seventy miles per hour is less serious (or not
serious at all) if the aim is to get an injured passenger to the hospital. Prosecutors are justified in failing to prosecute if they think
that the act served the overall good of avoiding evils (except perhaps when the crime generally is of such gravity (e.g., homicide)
that a more authoritative community judgment is preferable).
They may also properly decide against prosecution if they think
the balance is close, but that the offender's act was not justified.
Such behavior would fall within the class of "less serious" instances of the offense. Thus, at least for offenses that are not ordinarily of severe gravity, a prosecutor's leniency should extend
somewhat beyond the precise limits of the justification defense.
A prosecutor may also decide to be lenient because he deems an
actor to be a less serious offender than most of those who commit
crimes of similar gravity. The actor's participation may be marginal (e.g., lending an automobile), he may be a passive, unenthu-
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siastic follower of a more dominant personality, his mental condition may render him less blameworthy than the ordinary offender,
or-of more direct interest for us-his motivation and his beliefs
about the legality and morality of his conduct may suggest that he
is less antisocial than most offenders. Imagine two cases of simple,
unprovoked assault in which the victims have suffered bruises, but
not serious wounds or broken limbs. In the first, the actor has tried
to intimidate a victim for personal advantage; in the second, the
actor has attacked the victim under the mistaken but reasonable
belief that the victim had previously raped his sister. Although the
rape of a sister is not a legal justification for an assault, the actor
considers it ample moral justification. One reason why the prosecutor may treat the second actor more leniently is the social sense
that assaults in retaliation for undoubted injuries to family members are less wrongful than many other assaults. But perhaps
something akin to the conscientious objector principle is also operative; perhaps the actor's moral perspectives may matter even if
they do not conform with those of most members of society. Imagine that the second actor has assaulted someone for having consensual intercourse with the actor's twenty-five-year-old single sister,
the actor holding the now unorthodox belief that single women
should remain chaste and that male relatives should enforce this
behavior. If subsequent events (e.g., the marriage of the sister)
have sharply reduced the danger of future attacks by the actor and
general deterrence is not a concern, 84 the prosecutor might still decline to proceed, reasoning that the actor's motives and beliefs
render him less blameworthy and less dangerous than most
offenders.8 5
The analysis thus far bears on beliefs about moral rights as well
as moral duties. If the actor genuinely believes he had a moral
right to do what he did, and the presence of this belief does not
indicate the likelihood of future similar illegal acts (as often it will)
nor reflect some general insensitivity to the interests of others,
This is a very important qualification. If, for example, the actor belonged to a closely
knit religious sect whose members shared his view, prosecution might be necessary to ensure
the liberty of single females.
85 The point about blame is arguable. Some moral beliefs are so abhorrent that we think
the very holding of them is somehow blameworthy, attributable only to a moral failure. The
belief described might be so viewed, as reflecting an inexcusable insensitivity to the freedom
of women.
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then the belief should count in favor of leniency. Also relevant will
be the actor's perspective about the legality of his acts. If the actor
reasonably thinks that what he did was legal, or reasonably thinks
its legality was genuinely uncertain, his blame and likely propensity to commit future illegal acts may appear less than those of
most offenders.8 6 The substantive law rightly does not make reasonableness of belief in legality a defense except in limited circumstances.8 Demanding that courts determine what are reasonable
misbeliefs about the course of the law and that juries decide
whether defendants honestly held such beliefs would be too troublesome, and in any event, encouraging behavior at the very edges
of legality is not desirable. Prosecutorial leniency may also be inappropriate when the actor has selfishly done something that is
undeniably antisocial in the mistaken hope that it will prove not to
be legally proscribed. But when the actor has a reasonable and
firm conviction that what he has done is legal, or has some morally
grounded reasons for acting in uncertainty about his legal rights
(e.g., he wants to help test the limits of a law he thinks intrudes
upon valued liberties), then the argument for leniency applies. 88
There are three important qualifications to these conclusions.
First, because prosecution is, in fact, the major way of establishing
the statutory and constitutional limits of the criminal law, 9 criminal prosecution of some of those who may have acted on the
86 See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOusLY 206-22 (1977).
" See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (Off. Draft 1962); id. § 2.04, Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955). To be guilty of some crimes, such as theft, one must be aware of the crucial
legal rights in an object.
8 Ronald Dworkin thinks that the argument applies when the actor reasonably believes
the law, understood as a correct view of the relevant legal materials, is in his favor even if he
is quite certain the courts will decide against him (e.g., the actor thinks that compulsory
military service is involuntary servitude forbidden by the thirteenth amendment, though the
Supreme Court has consistently rejected that conclusion and no one predicts a contrary
result in .the foreseeable future). See R. DWORKIN, supra note 86, at 214-15. Dworkin then
goes on to say that those with analogous moral beliefs to our hypothetical actor should be
treated similarly, because they should not be penalized for lacking the legal sophistication to
transform their moral perspectives into the relevant legal conclusions. Id. This rather legalistic approach to the problem is very nearly backwards. There are good reasons to refrain
from prosecution of those with strong moral beliefs in support of their acts, and these also
apply to persons whose private view of the law (as it should be interpreted) supports their
position; but to ascribe deep significance to such views-often formed in enthusiastic response to positions advocated for public consumption by lawyer-activists who represent a
minuscule proportion of the profession-would be odd.
"I M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 14, at 101-06.
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borderlines of legality is necessary; but in that event, it is unnecessary to prosecute others whose convictions will not contribute to
the development of legal principles. Second, the deliberate and
open quality of much law violation engaged in by protestors not
only tends to demonstrate the convictions of the actors, it also represents a settled defiance of the authority of law that may seem to
demand a response. Persons in authority may quietly let minor
breaches of rules pass, but when the violations are announced in
advance and take place in their presence, the failure of the authorities to act may undercut claims that the rules, or the persons who
administer them, deserve respect.9 0 Moreover, in the realm of public affairs, open breaches of law are attended by much greater publicity than most surreptitious violations, and legal authorities must
concern themselves with the possibility that law-abiding citizens
will feel distressed, insecure, and perhaps put upon 91 if no action is
taken.2 The third qualification is closely related to the second.
While some kinds of conscientious law violation (e.g., refusal to
submit to the draft) do not presage further violations, other kinds
of open defiance (e.g., blocking of draft registrants or trespass on
nuclear facilities) do strongly suggest that further similar acts may
be forthcoming, since the actor's public aim is rarely achieved by
one instance of law violation. If discouragement of further violations is believed important, then punishment may appear
necessary.
To summarize, the overall harmfulness of behavior and the actor's sincerity of belief in moral justification, factors crucial for
standards of general justification and conscientious objection, also
are important ingredients for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Claims of moral right and opinions about legality that receive
little recognition in the substantive law may properly influence decisions by prosecutors. Finally, some aspects of certain illegal acts
that provide reasons for lenience may also support countervailing
reasons for prosecution.

" One thinks, for example, of parental disciplinary rules, athletic training rules, and employer regulations concerning work that are breached after prior announcement in front of

the authority that has set the rules.
'9 The latter sense is particularly likely if the violations, such as traffic obstructions,
cause public inconvenience.
2 In some instances of mass demonstrations, dispersement or arrests may appear to be
sufficient action even if prosecution does not follow.
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More subtle questions arise in considering the criteria a prosecutor should apply in making his decisions not to prosecute because
of the lesser gravity of conduct or the moral convictions of the actor. Is he a deputy of the legislature, an interpreter of the law, an
organ of community sentiment, or an independent agent working
to rationalize the law and make its application more just? My answer is that he should try to be a mix of all of these and that more
simple versions of his responsibilities are inadequate. When we
talk about a prosecutor's duty in this context, we are not in the
main concerned with his legal duty, since the law leaves him free
to perform in a variety of ways; however, it may still be that his
role, properly conceived, requires reference to values contained in
the law.
Most narrowly, the prosecutor might be guided by the legislature's views as revealed in the applicable criminal statutes; for example, the prosecutor may treat ordinary instances of consenting
acts between homosexuals as seriously as assault with a deadly
weapon if these crimes have been classified as equally serious in
the penal code. Given the extreme irrationality that has characterized grading in most American jurisdictions, and the failure to repeal (or reduce the severity of) many crimes when community mores have shifted radically, the idea that prosecutors should not look
beyond the grade fixed by legislatures cannot seriously be urged. A
somewhat more plausible view is that the prosecutor should try to
be guided by how the legislature would presently act. That approach, however, also has defects. How to decide what a majority
of persons would do about questions they have not faced would be
difficult, and in any event, the prosecutor should not regard himself as a transmitter of irrationalities that present legislators might
accept but have not yet written into law. There is more to executive judgment than trying to mirror the elusive sentiments of the
legislature; room exists for creative attempts at rational administration, even when the present majority of the legislature might
not accept all the elements of that administration if they had the
time and energy to focus upon them as carefully as the executive.
The "whole law" would no doubt properly be one source of such a
rational administration. Thus, the prosecutor might decide that
given constitutional values of liberty, the law of torts, and the interests that statutes protect in other contexts, the "law as a whole"
does not regard consenting homosexual acts as being as grave a
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harm as assault with a deadly weapon, even if the two are classed
equally in the jurisdiction's criminal code. The prosecutor still
should not be regarded as constrained completely by existing law.
For example, if a substantial shift has taken place in community
morality about sexual relations among consenting adults, his policy
should be responsive to that shift even if it has not yet been reflected, or fully reflected, in the various branches of the law.
Beyond this discretion, a prosecutor can properly make some
judgments about needs of criminal law enforcement that are
neither implicit in the law nor yet generally accepted by the community. Within a limited range, he may be guided by what he believes to be right principles of enforcement. Not only is the prosecutor less constrained by legal standards than judges who apply
the law, he is also politically more responsible, subject to being dismissed or voted out of office. Moreover, like most administrative
officials, prosecutors will in general do a better job (and better
people will be attracted to the job of prosecutor) if they conceive of
their role as involving some scope for individual judgment about
desirable policy rather than considering their responsibility to be
to transmit as perfectly as possible the uncertain sentiments of the
legislature or the community.
Although the prosecutor's role leaves some scope for individual
judgment, he does not have the same range of authority as the legislature to decide what measures comport with justice and social
welfare. This point can be illustrated by reference to a position
that seems to imply that he does have such authority for at least
one situation-when legislation violates the moral rights of citizens. Asserting what we may label a "strong rights" view, Ronald
Dworkin has urged that, if the government adopts a law that violates a moral right, the government "does a further wrong to enforce that law""3 and the citizen has a moral right to disobey the
94
law.
Digressing somewhat from the prosecutor's individual judgment,
I shall first address the conclusion that the citizen has a moral

"R. DWORKIN, supra note 86, at 192.
Id. at 192-93. I do not understand Dworkin to suggest that it is part of the definition of
a moral right against the government that the right overrides infringing prohibitions.
Rather, that power to override is deemed to be a consequence based on the nature of the
original rights, a consequence for which Dworkin provides arguments.
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right to disobey, a conclusion that bears on what the prosecutor
should do if he thinks that a law violates moral rights. We may
start with an obvious qualification about the claimed moral right
to disobey. A white factory owner in South Africa begins with a
moral right to associate freely with Africans. If, however, a law is
passed making such associations criminal, if the factory owner is
aware that Africans are hesitant to refuse such associations pressed
upon them by dominant whites, and if he knows that punishment
for such associations is usually inflicted on Africans rather than
whites, his moral duty of concern toward the Africans who might
be severely harmed by his efforts to associate may remove his
moral right to associate as far as that right guards against outside
nongovernmental interference. 5
What the strong rights position asserts is that, as against the
government, the moral right still exists: no general duty to obey
the law can undercut a subject's moral right against the government to perform the act in question. The correctness of this position is far from obvious. If a powerful social contract (or reciprocal
fairness) theory is correct, a person's duty to obey the law may be
regarded as a corollary of the right of other members of the society
to have generally defined duties observed. Under some circumstances, such theories would have force. For example, all the
professors on a law school faculty agree that the curriculum needs
more coherence and that, for the sake of the students, the subject
matter in various courses requires more central supervision. All
also recognize the right of each professor to academic freedom and,
though understanding the difficulties of identifying when that line
of interference has been crossed, agree that reform should not infringe the right. A committee selected by the faculty produces recommendations for eliminating duplications, including a proposal
that the privilege against self-incrimination, which is taught in a
95 In this paper, I have assumed, as does Dworkin, that a moral right is a right against
interference. Thus, the white's moral responsibility to avoid association once the law is
passed is not necessarily inconsistent with his having a moral right to associate. Nevertheless, many moral rights operate against interference by other private persons as well as
against the government, and this right to associate would initially fall into that category.
What the law's passage may do is to make the association so dangerous for the black participants that others may now have a claim on the white not to associate and may be justified
in attempting to prevent him from engaging in such association by means not consonant
with the existence of a moral right.
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heavily attended criminal process course, no longer be taught in
constitutional law. Only Professor A of the six constitutional law
professors objects; he thinks that Miranda v. Arizona 6 is central
to an understanding of modern constitutional adjudication and
that Miranda can be understood only if three sessions are spent on
coerced confessions and the privilege against self-incrimination. He
dissents from the faculty's adoption of that proposal, having commented that he thinks it may even impair his academic freedom.
Only over the summer does he develop the firm and strong conviction that preclusion of matter he considers so vital for presentation
of his own views does constitute such an impairment. Assuming
that he is correct and the faculty wrong, his "rights" have been
infringed. Does it follow that he has a moral right simply to spend
his usual three hours on the privilege? I think not. Given the unanimous faculty sense of the need for central direction and the mutual sacrifices of autonomy, each faculty member may have a right
that others observe the restrictions placed on them. At the very
least, A owes it to his colleagues not to disregard the resolution
until he has presented his position in the fullest way possible. Further, suppose A recognizes that anyone's refusal to abide by the
faculty resolution will lead to other refusals by professors whose
claims actually fall on the other side of the elusive line between
academic freedom and legitimate control, the likely end result being practical defeat of this needed reform and recrimination among
colleagues. In short, one's moral right to perform an act does not
always continue unabated when a misguided rights-violating prohibition is adopted.
Because I do not believe in such a powerful version of a contract
or fairness theory as a source of obligation for a citizen's relation to
the law, I must forfeit that special feature of the argument in the
broader context. Nevertheless, much disobedience may be understood as a kind of disrespect for or insult towards one's fellow citizens, a subtle affront to their dignity. The law violator seems especially insensitive to the claims of others if neither he nor his
fellows have adequately apprised appropriate officials why they
think a law, or prospective law, to be in violation of their moral
rights. Even if the only bases for obedience to law were the utilitarian benefits of a stable social order, the "strong rights" view
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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would be too simple. Dworkin argues that, if social utility cannot
override a moral right in the first place, the utilitarian gains of
obedience to law logically cannot override the moral right.9 7 However, the reasons for accepting the principle that governments cannot interfere with rights in order to achieve marginal gains in the
general welfare may not apply with equal force to the proposal
that individuals should properly view their rights as overriding
general benefits of obedience to law. 8 These are quite different issues. For example, if moral rights against governments are seen
mainly as safeguards against misguided government decisions, one
might consistently believe that rights should override welfare considerations in the first context, but not in the second.
A closely related aspect of the "strong rights" view is the position that the government does a further wrong to enforce the law.
Of course, enforcement is undeniably a kind of continuation of the
original wrong, but the point seems to be that it would be better if
the government did not enforce the law. The claim is not that enforcement of mistaken prohibitions is always wrong. Parents, for
example, may sometimes rightly believe that, once having forbidden behavior and warned of the consequences of disregard, they
should respond to "violations" as they said they would, even if
they have come to regret the original prohibition. For a government, also, consistent application possesses virtues. According to
the "strong rights" position, these virtues are overridden if the
substantive rules violate rights; however, if the law's violation of a
moral right does not necessarily produce a moral right for the actor
to disobey, government enforcement may not be wrong.
Apart from the line of criticism developed thus far, the "strong
rights" view is crucially incomplete as a guide to action until it
addresses allocation of roles, a subject that brings us back to the
independent judgment of the prosecutor. The assertion that the
government does a further wrong to enforce the law either is at a
high level of abstraction and without much practical significance or
represents a mistaken view of role allocation. At a minimum, the
notion of "further wrong" suggests that, if the legislature comes to
R. DWORKiN, supra note 86, at 193.
8 See Finnis, Some Professorial Fallacies About Rights, 4 ADEL. L. REV. 377, 384 (1972);
Nickel, Dworkin on the Nature and Consequences of Rights, 11 GA. L. REV. 1115, 1141-42
(1977).
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see the error of its ways and repeals its prohibition, it should exempt from punishment previous violators not yet prosecuted (in
any event the usual principle of interpretation when criminal
prohibitions are repealed) and should let free all violators then being punished (not the usual practice). Because legislatures rarely
reach focused judgments that they have previously violated rights,
acceptance of the general principle of further wrong would have a
slight impact. If the claim, however, is that each executive official
should decide whether moral rights are violated-that police
should refuse to arrest and prosecutors refuse to prosecute because
they think a statute violates moral rights-then the claim is wrong.
Suppose, for example, that the legislature has recently deliberated about the problem of abortion. Conforming to Supreme Court
interpretations of the constitutional requirements, it has recognized the right of women to have abortions with the consent of
their doctors through the sixth month of pregnancy, but it has decisively taken the view that, absent strong health reasons, termination of a viable fetus is a very serious wrong, punishable by up to
twenty years in jail. A woman who enters the hospital at the beginning of her labor tells her doctor that she has decided she does not
want the baby and asks the doctor to abort the fetus in a manner
causing its death. He does so, and outraged members of the hospital staff present evidence of this crime to the prosecutor. The prosecutor is firmly convinced that the fetus has no moral rights until
actual birth, that no moral wrong was done in this case, and that
following the law would deny the woman her moral rights. The
prosecutor also recognizes, however, that his is a decidedly minority sentiment, at odds with the views of the vast majority of the
population as well as with the recently considered and strongly expressed views of the legislature. In such A circumstance, the prosecutor's political duty is to prosecute. However broad the appropriate range for individual judgment, he is, first and foremost, a
representative of society at large and of the legislature, which is
society's formal voice. Fallible as they are, legislatures and courts
are better organs to assess claims of moral right than policemen
and prosecutors. Quite apart from comparative ability to evaluate
claims of moral right, legislatures in our system have the political
authority to violate moral rights if they do not violate the Constitution. The prosecutor's oath of office implies an obligation to accept the underlying distribution of political power and basic judg-
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ments of superior legal authorities, so a political duty that goes
beyond mere utilitarian calculation is involved when he refuses to
enforce the law in these circumstances.
Without a host of radical alterations in our system of criminal
justice, police and prosecutorial discretion cannot be eliminated.
Serious proposals for reform have concentrated on limiting and
channeling that discretion." One point seems obvious and applies
to the sorts of instances that I have discussed as well as to other
prosecutorial choices. Policy about classes of cases is best set by
higher authorities in the prosecutor's office, not by individual
members of the staff. Without central direction, consistency is impossible, and it is the higher authorities who carry the political responsibility that makes reliance on their individual judgments appropriate. Given the complexity of the relevant variables when
claims of moral justification, moral right, and conscience bear on
decisions whether to prosecute, one cannot reasonably expect highly specific standards that will serve as easily applicable guides for
the disposition of particular cases. As to these matters, it would
seem inappropriate to give potential defendants any formal right
to argue to prosecutorial officials that they should not be prosecuted, both because the standard of decision and relevant facts
would often be so intractable and because such a procedure would
involve a quasi-limitation in the apparent coverage of the substantive law that would undermine some of the law's symbolic offices.
For these same reasons, especially the latter, the wisdom of publicizing whatever open-ended standards prosecutors are able to
evolve is also doubtful. There would be no harm in notifying the
public in a general way that the wrongfulness of behavior and the
character of the actor may count-so much will already be obvious.
If a definite decision has been made against prosecution of any of a
clear class of cases, that information should probably be made
available. Perhaps, however, prosecutors should not publicize the
flexible criteria used to make judgments about prosecution within
classes of cases.
B. Pardon and Amnesty Issued Prior to Prosecution
The executive may issue pardons to individual offenders (such as

"See

generally K. DAvis, supra note 81, at 162-214.
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President Nixon) or to classes of offenders (such as draft law violators) before the offenders have been prosecuted; and legislatures
may also pass laws excusing violators not yet tried. These actions
represent determinations not to proceed that are, of course, more
formal and final than decisions of prosecutors not to press charges.
Except for whatever constraints the allocation of authority between executive and legislature may impose 00 and for restrictions
against using impermissible criteria to define the group benefited,101 decisions about who will receive pardon or amnesty are
essentially unlimited by law. Because the basis for pardon or amnesty'12 is often the view that those to be benefited are less dangerous or less culpable than the legislatively determined severity of
their offenses might indicate, the same considerations that bear on
prosecutorial decisions to be lenient are relevant. The major difference is that those deciding upon amnesty and pardon owe less deference to the original legislative decision about the magnitude of a
crime.
This point is most obvious when the legislature grants amnesty.
Values of continuity may caution s6me respect for existing law and
the continued operation of presently imposed punishments, but if
the present legislature determines that an original legislative judgment was misconceived or that grounds of protest warranted illegal
action, no loyalty to a superior prevents it from acting on that
judgment by forgiving the offenders. Politically responsible legislators are also much better suited to decide that earlier political decisions (e.g., to fight in Vietnam) were actually misconceived, or
are now generally understood to have been misconceived, than are
judges or prosecutors. Moreover, they may appropriately give more
weight to contemporary political factors, such as the subsidence of
resentment toward draft violators or the need to heal bitter divisions that termination of the conflict may have brought.
10 On the overlapping authority of executive and legislative branches, see Buchanan, The
Nature of a Pardon Under the United States Constitution, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 36 (1978);
Freeman, An HistoricalJustificationand Legal Basis for Amnesty Today, 1971 LAw Soc.
ORD. 515; Lusky, Congressional Amnesty for War Resisters: Policy Considerations and
ConstitutionalProblems, 25 VAiN. L. REv. 525, 540-43 (1972).
10 In particular, I have in mind constitutional bars on racial, religious, and other "suspect" forms of classification.
102 The variant connotations of the term "amnesty" are briefly summarized in Greenawalt, Vietnam Amnesty-Problems of Justice and Line-Drawing, 11 GA. L. REv. 1 (1976).
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Similar conclusions apply to executive pardon, though with
somewhat diminished force. Prosecutorial discretion is, within our
system, a necessary consequence of the authority to execute the
laws, but the pardoning power has separate historical grounding
and independent constitutional specification. In the exercise of
that power, the executive has some greater latitude to deviate from
legislative judgment and to take account of relevant political factors. I say "some greater latitude," because I think a degree of
deference is still owed to the decisions of the coordinate branch.
Thus, even a president or governor would need very powerful reasons simply to pardon everyone who committed a particular crime
that he thought should not be on the books.
IV.

"NULLIFICATION" OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW

A.

Jury Nullification

By returning a verdict of not guilty when in fact they believe
that a defendant is guilty of the crime with which he is charged,
jurors have the power to "nullify" the substantive law. They can
also nullify the written law in a more moderate fashion, by returning a verdict for a lesser offense when they believe the defendant is guilty of the more serious offense with which he has been
charged. One juror alone (or a minority of jurors in jurisdictions
that allow conviction with less than unanimity) can, if sufficiently
strong-willed and persistent, block application of the law to the offender by refusing to vote for conviction. Whether jurors have legal
authority to engage in such refusals to apply the law is a complex
question.1 03 At an early point in history, jurors could be punished
for rendering verdicts against the evidence, but now when they acquit, their decision for the defendant cannot be reviewed and they
cannot be punished for failing to fulfill their temporary official
duty. Nevertheless, jurors are instructed to apply the law as the
judge gives it to them, and despite three narrowly interpreted state
constitutional standards that grant jurors authority to determine
the law, 104 the earlier dispute over whether jurors are the ultimate
103

See generally M. KAnIsH & S. KADISH, supra note 14, at 45-66; Christie, Lawful De-

partures from Legal Rules: "Jury Nullification" and Legitimated Disobedience, 62 CALIF.
L. REv. 1288, 1296-1305 (1974).
10 See M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 14, at 49 (citing GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2-201;
IND. CONST. art. 1, § 19; Mo. CONST. art. XV, § 19).
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finders of law as well as fact has now been decisively resolved: jurors must take the law as the judge gives it to them. Defendant's
counsel can neither argue that the jury should disregard those instructions nor present evidence in favor of the proposition that the
defendant should be acquitted despite violating the law.
How is the legal duty of jurors to be understood? One view is
that the power of acquittal establishes a right of acquittal. As
Chancellor James Kent put it, "The law must.., have intended,
in granting this power to a jury, to grant them a lawful and rightful
power, or it would have provided a remedy against the undue exercise of it." 105 Without more, however, this position is too simple.
The law may confer unreviewable power for a variety of reasons.
Judges of highest courts, for example, have essentially unreviewable authority 06 to determine the law, because in a practical system of government such power must be placed somewhere. Yet
certainly some interpretations of law could be so egregious, so far
beyond permissible bounds, that we should say. that the judges
who made them violated their legal duty and acted outside their
authority. In cases in which substantial evidence is produced
against the defendant, jurors have, as George Christie has pointed
out, effective power to convict on less than the reasonable doubt
standard.1 07 That is to say, if the jurors consciously determine that
the evidence does not meet that requisite, but that the defendant
is probably guilty and is certainly a dangerous character who
should be locked up, they can convict and no other organ of government will be able to go beyond their verdict and undo their
finding of guilt. We should, nevertheless, be hesitant to say that
the jurors have legal authority to convict on less than beyond a
reasonable doubt. Power does not necessarily demonstrate right.
The contrary position-that the jury's legal duty is always simply to apply the law as the judge instructs it-also presents some
difficulties, because the undoubted power to acquit rests on something more than the impracticality of review. One of the historic
arguments for jury trial is that a community check against enforceId. at 51.
They are, of course, subject to discipline or impeachment if their deviations from responsibility are too flagrant; and in states where judges are subject to election or periodic
reappointment, they may be removed from office by ordinary political processes.
107 Christie, supra note 103, at 1301.
108
10"
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ment of arbitrary laws is desirable; and jury refusals to convict
publishers charged with seditious libel and petty thieves facing
mandatory death penalties are celebrated as civilizing the administration of justice. When the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment required states to afford jury trials in criminal
cases, the possibility of jury nullification was treated as one of the
characterisitics making jury trial fundamental to our system of justice.105 A judge can direct judgment for either party in a civil case
and can direct acquittal in a criminal case. His inability to direct a
finding of guilt in a criminal trial rests not on the impracticality of
such a procedure but on a special solicitude for the criminal defendant, a sense that he should not be convicted without a supportive
judgment by members of the community. Even such an apparently
innocuous technique as requiring the jury to make particular findings of fact as well as returning a general verdict has been said to
undercut its "historic function . . . of tempering rules of law by
common sense." 1091 Thus, the jury's power to nullify the law on occasion is viewed as a positive feature of its operation, one that is
self-consciously protected by ancillary doctrines.
Finding each of the two simple competing views to be unsatisfactory, Mortimer and Sanford Kadish, in their insightful book Discretion to Disobey,110 conclude that juries are under a legal obligation to follow instructions and have a legal right to disobey the
instructions if the reasons for doing so are strong enough.1 1 Jurors
are exemplars of officials who occupy "recourse roles" and who are
permitted to depart from the prescribed means for exercising their
roles when they believe that the ends for which their roles are created will not be served if they fail to digress. 11 2 The obligation to
follow the prescribed means is like a promissory obligation in ordinary life-one that must be given considerable weight but can be
overridden by very strong contrary reasons.
This account of the juror's responsibility under our system may
make us somewhat uncomfortable, because we are used to thinking
that the law either forbids, requires, or permits actions. My own
108Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
109 United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969).
110 M. KADISH

& S.

"I Id. at 56-66.
112Id. at 59-66.

KADISH,

supra note 14.
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appreciation for the Kadish view, which reflects sophistication
about subtle variations in the messages that may be conveyed to
actors in a social enterprise, has been enhanced by reflection on
what I say when my nine- and eight-year-old boys want to do
things that thirty-five years ago I regarded as part of the birthright
of every youth but that now seem fraught with potential danger,
such as walking on high walls, shooting metal clips with slingshots, throwing sticks and small rocks at the enemy of the moment, hitting brothers in assorted parts of the anatomy, and climbing out of windows. I discover that, whether I am presented with a
fait accompli or involved myself before the event, my responses are
modulated according to my feelings of danger and acceptability.
For the actions that I regard as worst, I may say something like:
"This is absolutely forbidden. You should never do that. If you do
it again, you will be seriously punished." On other occasions I say
things like: "That's a very bad idea. You really shouldn't do that";
or "That is really stupid. You know you can hurt someone (yourself) that way"; or "I am very disappointed in you for doing X"
(hitting a brother in a part of the body not absolutely forbidden);
or "You really shouldn't do that, but if you must, be very careful."
Though the last comment comes close to a grudging permission,
what I am struggling somehow to do in many instances is to avoid
conveying a genuine permission, something that may connote approval or acceptance, and yet to steer clear of absolute prohibition.
I should not want to make too much of this analogy, especially
since what underlies my variations is a wish not to dilute the
prohibitions of the worst acts or overburden the boys with absolute
"no's" and a hope that their own sense of responsibility will develop-reasons quite different from those that underlie the conflicting messages the legal system conveys about jury responsibilities. But if a small amount of self-study reveals such subtleties in
parental attempts to guide children, we should hardly remain surprised that something as complicated as a legal system may not
offer straightforward directions about the performance of some important responsibilities.
Since judges do not instruct juries about their power to nullify
the law, the dearth of writing on how conscientious jurors should
exercise that power is not surprising; but I want to consider what
standard might be applied by a thoughtful juror who is considering
acquittal even though he recognizes that application of the judge's
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instructions to the facts would yield a guilty verdict. Few now believe that lay jurors should supplant the judge's instructions with
their own interpretation of the law, and such authority would be
hard to defend. The authority that is implicitly conceded to jurors
is rather that they may disregard the law when its application
would be highly unjust. As the Kadishes put it, the jurors must
place a "significant surcharge" on denial of their obligation to apply the law.113 A juror should not acquit unless he is firmly convinced that a gross injustice would be done by conviction. He must
believe more than that the actor's motives were good or that the
law is a bad one. He must think that the actor was performing an
act that was clearly justified or was exercising an undeniable moral
right. Ordinarily, he would have to think either that the law on
which the prosecution is based is itself highly unjust or that the
particular circumstances of the case are so far outside what the
legislature had in mind that the law's application in this case
would be unconscionable. In rare cases, for example, when jurors
are strongly persuaded that protestors had an overwhelmingly
powerful reason to break a law, acquittal may be warranted even
though jurors do not consider the law itself unjust or the situation
to be outside the legislature's intentions. Perhaps the jury needs
less strong reasons when the form of nullification is reducing the
crime involved (say from murder to manslaughter) without justification in the law and facts. Because the defendant will still be convicted and receive a sentence, the jury's defiance of the law in this
situation is not quite so great.
One final distinction needs to be drawn. Some cases will present
a genuine issue of guilt on the basis of the evidence, and an outsider may not be able to tell whether the jury honestly disbelieved
the prosecutor's version of the facts or believed it, but nevertheless
determined not to convict. Indeed, the jurors voting for acquittal
may represent both positions, and the jurors wishing to nullify may
deceive the other jurors about the grounds for their votes. In such
cases, nullification may be surreptitious; no one will be sure it has
taken place. Such violations of the ordinary premises of the system
still require strong justification, but since the practical damage will
be less if others are not aware of what has occurred, such manipulation may occasionally be warranted even if an open and clear
123

Id. at 60.
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nullification would not be.
The law itself supplies the guiding criteria for jury nullification
only to a limited degree. In some cases, jurors may reach behind
the letter of the broken law to its ascertainable spirit, perceiving
that the individual violator was simply not a person that the legislature really wanted to penalize. In other instances, jurors may be
aware that a particular prohibition is out of line with other, more
important provisions of the law. For the most part, a juror must
call upon his own, individual sense of justice to decide if a legally
warranted conviction would be so intolerable that he should not
vote for it. Thus, if jury nullification is an instance in which agents
"undertake actions outside the role's prescribed means to achieve
the role's ends, ' 141 the "ends" may be general ones of justice and
fairness; the jurors themselves may fill in the content of those
ends, not from any special conception of the criminal law as it then
exists but from a less focused appreciation of when condemnation
and punishment is acceptable.
Practical interest in the status of jury nullification increased
greatly with the trials of those who refused military service in Vietnam or protested the war there. Change in the present understanding could take place in either direction. Jury nullification could be
more clearly labeled an illegitimate exercise of power, perhaps
stripped of some of the support it now enjoys from tangential rules
of law, no longer forming the basis for any constitutional doctrines
about right to jury trial or providing a subject of admiration for
thoughtful commentators. Conversely, jury nullification could be
formally recognized, with juries instructed about their power and,
perhaps, with lawyers presenting evidence and argument about the
appropriateness of deciding against the law in particular cases.1 15
It is, of course, anomalous for the law implicitly to recognize and
approve a power it does not admit to those who must exercise it.
Jurors who have no instructions about authority to nullify can
hardly be expected to have reasonably consistent notions on when
the duty to apply the law is outweighed by other considerations; on
that score, defendants are at the mercy of the private notions of
their particular juries. But formidable objections exist against a
Id. at 31.
"0 See L. VELVEL, UNDECLARED WAR AND CxVIL DISOBEDENcE 215-37 (1970); Hall, Legal
Toleration of Civil Disobedience, 81 ETHics 128, 135-42 (1971).
114

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 67:177

shift. If jury nullification could be effectively discouraged, the law
would lose a humanizing element that prevents occasional injustices. If jury nullification were formally approved, the proper authority of the written law might be undermined. As all recognize,
juries may nullify for bad reasons as well as good, and no one has
yet thought of a formula that would produce nullification only in
deserving cases. The sensible assumption is that if juries were instructed about their power to nullify, this would increase the instances of nullification;1n some of these would be victories for
prejudice, some for understandable but overly generous sympathy.
George Christie has made the further observation that such instructions would tend to have the undesirable effect of relieving
the moral responsibility that jurors feel for nullification and increasing their sense of moral responsibility for convictions, because
they could no longer view themselves as simple agents of the law
sworn to do as it directs. 11 7 If defense attorneys could present evidence and argument in favor of nullification, the dangers of appeal
to prejudice would be greatly enhanced and trials of many political
protesters would be turned into unconstrained debates over controversial political issues.
My own judgment is that some language should be discoverable
that would alert all jurors to the existence of the nullification
power, but would indicate in the strongest terms that it should be
reserved for only the most exceptional cases. I believe that the
gains in openness and consistency would outweigh any harms from
a possible slight increase in instances of nullification. Because,
however, I think one of the crucial values of the law is its capacity
to focus and narrow issues and to make cases turn on something
other than the political and social sympathies of juries, no evidence
or argument on the possibility of nullification should be permitted.
B. Judge Nullification
Judges in criminal cases also have the power to nullify the substantive law. In jury trials, they can direct jurors to acquit when
evidence clearly supports a finding of guilt; when trial is before the
bench, they can acquit though persuaded of legal guilt. Such deter1

See M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 14, at 65.
See Christie, supra note 103, at 1304.
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minations are unreviewable, and the possibility of any disciplinary
action for isolated instances of nullification is remote. Judicial
power to nullify the substantive law has never been suggested as a
desirable feature of trial before judges, and the nonreviewability of
their decisions to acquit may be thought to derive more from implications of the defendant's right against double jeopardy than
from any sense that the judge is an appropriate agent to second
guess the legislature about what behavior should be criminal.
Judges are permanent officers of the law sworn to uphold the law,
not representatives of community sentiment. Perhaps in serious
cases,118 judges have no authority like that of the jury to engage in
justified departures from the rules of the substantive law. If they
do have any such authority, it is much more limited than the parallel authority of juries.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that some convictions would be so
abhorrent that judicial defiance of the law would be defensible and
this conclusion may be true even if such action is considered to be
outside the law in every sense. Given the judge's greater understanding of the law, its values may more fully inform his evaluation of possible justifications for nullification in particular cases
than will be true for jurors. Both because of the nature of his office
and because he can usually find a way of mitigating the rigors of
the law through his sentencing power, a judge will need much more
powerful reasons than a jury before engaging in nullification.
V

SENTENCING DETERMINATIONS AND OTHER DECISIONS ABOUT
CONFINEMENT OR THE NATURE OF PUNISHMENT

A lenient sentence is one way in which conflicts between the law
and an offender's moral convictions can be ameliorated.
A.

Judicial Sentences

Statutes in most jurisdictions confer great discretion upon
judges to decide how severe sentences will be; so long as he
sentences within the specified range, the judge does not exceed his
"I*I add this qualification because with respect to some petty offenses, such as traffic
violations, it may be thought that judges have an implicit authority to decline to hold technically guilty offenders criminally liable. The Model Penal Code explicitly gives judges
power to dismiss "de minimis infractions," MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (Off. Draft 1962), but
such provisions are not common.
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legal authority.11 9 Sentencing judges, as well as prosecutors who
often make heavily influential recommendations about sentence,
are properly responsive to the reasons for treating law violators
less severely when they have plausible claims of moral justification
or moral right or are moved by conscience. When the law contains
general standards for guiding the judge's decision about severity,
those standards typically encompass the sorts of considerations
discussed here,12 including matters such as character, likely future
dangerousness, and gravity of the crime. These general standards,
of course, provide no precise direction about the weighting of particular factors; judges, like prosecutors, must rely on a broader
sense that includes but is not limited to the practices of other
judges and the intimations of legal materials beyond the specific
substantive and sentencing provisions involved.
Even within essentially discretionary sentencing structures, legislators may establish substantial mandatory minimum sentences
for specific offenses or for habitual offenders. Under the recent
"just deserts" approach to sentencing, 21 much less latitude is left
to judges in ordinary cases. Although undercharging by prosecutors
often saves them from a nasty dilemma, judges are sometimes
presented with cases in which they make the judgment that the
minimum sentence would be unduly harsh, and with some frequency they decline to impose the sentence called for by the statute. 22 Given the legislative decision to impose mandatory minimum sentences for designated classes of offenders, these judicial
acts cannot be considered exercises of delegated power; but if it is
generally understood and accepted that judges will smooth the
rougher edges of required sentences, the refusal to impose these
sentences in certain cases may be viewed as authorized in the sense
in which jury nullification is authorized. 28 Before a judge declines
to impose a-specified sanction, his reasons must be very strong. To
1' If, however, he gives the lightest sentence only to whites and consistently sentences
otherwise similar blacks more severely, he violates the equal protection clause. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
120 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Off. Draft 1962).
121 See, e.g., R. SINGER, JUST Ds.sRTs (1979).
122 See, e.g., D. NwmAN, CONVICTION 178 (1966).
"" Similar problems are raised when judges are permitted to mitigate harshness if specified criteria are met, but believe mitigation is appropriate for particular cases not covered
by the criteria. Because criteria for leniency are usually fairly open and likely to encompass
the situations discussed in this essay, we need not separately consider this variation.

1981]

Conflicts

some extent, the law as a whole may help guide him, as when the
specific statute applicable to the case is uncharacteristically harsh
or rigid in comparison with other provisions relating to similar
matters; but in other circumstances, the judge will have to rely on
some broader evaluation of the proper aims of criminal law.
B. Parole Board Determination
Parole boards traditionally have had very extensive discretion in
determining when to release offenders from prison. Whatever criteria have been provided by statute for these decisions have been
cast in broad terms that permit evaluation of the actor's character
and the harm to society of the crimes he might commit if he violates the law after release. 124 For our purposes, discretionary parole
board decisions about release are not in principle different from
sentencing decisions, though postsentence behavior and the character of the. actor will often loom larger than reevaluations of the
underlying criminal act. Similar considerations about the gravity of
conduct and about character may come into play when conditions
of parole have been violated, and parole authorities must make a
discretionary decision whether to revoke parole' 2 5 Parole boards
also determine on what conditions an offender will be released.
The rigor and the content of these conditions will be partly determined by judgments about the character of the offender and the
danger he poses to the community; to a limited extent, the board's
assessment of the reasons behind the underlying criminal act may
be relevant.
C. Pardon and Amnesty
When pardon or amnesty is granted after conviction, its main
significance is to affect the sentence imposed as well as the collateral consequences of criminal conviction. As already indicated in
connection with pretrial pardons, executive and legislative judgments about excusing offenders will be influenced by the character
of the offenders and the gravity of their crimes. When such determinations are made, less deference need be given to prior legislative policy than should be afforded by prosecutors.

12

1"

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.9 (Off. Draft 1962).
See, e.g., id. § 305.15.
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Magistrates must decide whether to confine a charged offender,
set bail, or release the offender on his own recognizance. Even if
the ostensible orthodoxy is correct that the only purpose in setting
bail is to assure that the person charged will not escape trial, evaluation of the nature of the crime will be relevant to the likelihood
that someone may try to escape. Of course, the offender's sense of
moral rectitude is not always a sure guarantee against flight; one
need only think of revolutionary activists who may be part of some
larger organization and for whom flight may actually be more
likely than for ordinary offenders. Often, however, the offender's
powerful belief that he has acted rightly will coexist with a willingness, even a desire, that his claim be aired in the public forum of a
trial. Once the magistrate has a sense of the likelihood of flight
under variant conditions-imprisonment, high bail, low bail, release without bail-the seriousness of the crime will count in calculations of the acceptable degree of risk, and possible moral justifications will tell here. If A has killed for pay and B has given poison
to a terminally ill relative who asked to be killed, both may be
guilty of murder, but a certain risk that the offender will go untried might appear tolerable for B but not for A.
In practice, magistrates making bail decisions also may consider
the danger that an offender poses to the community during the
pretrial period, at least when very serious crimes are involved.
Whether that consideration is in some sense legally authorized is
itself a troubling question, but in any event, moral claims in favor
of disobedience would matter for such determinations, for the light
they shed on the likelihood that the offender would commit further crimes and on the probable harm to the community if further
crimes were committed.
VI.

ADMINISTRATION OF PUNISHMENT AND OTHER CONFINEMENT

Some officials, such as prison wardens, have as their primary responsibility the administration of confinement or other aspects of
punishment whose basic nature has been determined by someone
else.12 6 A warden may make only limited judgments about security
16

In drawing this dichotomy between determinations about the nature of punishment

and administration, I am oversimplifying. Obviously, decisions about proper administration
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needs and promising programs for particular offenders; except as
he credits good time, determinations about the length of imprisonment are not his business. Reflection on his responsibilities brings
home most sharply the point about role allocation; although his
estimations about the character of the offender may properly influence his decisions about the precise conditions of confinement,
surely his job does not include responsibility for making judgments
about whether a section of the substantive criminal law violates
moral rights or whether a conviction offends some moral principle.
If the warden releases a prisoner or designedly permits escape because of his own determination of the presence of those grounds,
he does so wholly outside the law, and only the most compelling
reasons of morality could justify such a course. Some of these reasons might find support in other legal norms that would help the
warden identify a gross injustice, but it is very improbable that he
would conceive of his choice as being mainly guided by the law as a
whole. Rather, only a profound dissatisfaction with major features
of the law would be likely to produce a belief in reasons strong
enough to warrant the extreme departure from his ordinary role
that a personal determination to release would involve.
VII.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed various agencies of amelioration between the
demands of the law and the perceived demands of morality. Instead of it being the fact that once the basic legal rules have been
established no further room exists to accommodate the moral
claims that citizens acknowledge, these claims can affect the disposition of offenders in a variety of ways. Some of these ways are
plainly within the law, others involve official defiance of law, and
still others enjoy a twilight status, not receiving explicit authorization, but obtaining some degree of acceptance from the legal system. Many decisions in favor of amelioration require delicate judgments about complex considerations. To some extent, the guides to
these judgments may be found within the law as a whole, but often
the decisionmaker must reach outside the law and make an independent determination of the legitimate purposes of the criminal
law and of the proper bases for social interference with individual

will to some degree influence the nature of the-punishment inflicted.
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action. One is tempted to generalize from these examples that, in
carrying out social roles, officials draw partly from the conception
of the role as publicly understood, partly from individual judgments about the special responsibilities of the role, and partly from
a sense of broader social values and purposes to which a particular
role makes a contribution. It would be surprising if judges making
legal decisions are wholly different in this respect from other officials. When they make determinations of substantive law, they are
undoubtedly more fully constrained by existing legal materials
than the officials who make the decisions I have discussed; nevertheless, some room remains for reference outside the law. Understanding judicial responsibilities in that role, the subject of extensive jurisprudential discussion, can be enhanced by a comparison
with the responsibilities of other officials of the law. Apart from
their own intrinsic importance, the matters discussed in this article
can help provide focus for that comparison.

